Assurance Management Framework for Access Control Systems by Hu, Hongxin (Author) et al.
Assurance Management Framework for Access Control Systems
by
Hongxin Hu
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved July 2012 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Gail-Joon Ahn, Chair
Stephen S. Yau
Partha Dasgupta
Nong Ye
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
August 2012
ABSTRACT
Access control is one of the most fundamental security mechanisms used in
the design and management of modern information systems. However, there still
exists an open question on how formal access control models can be automatically
analyzed and fully realized in secure system development. Furthermore, specify-
ing and managing access control policies are often error-prone due to the lack of
effective analysis mechanisms and tools.
In this dissertation, I present an Assurance Management Framework (AMF)
that is designed to cope with various assurance management requirements from both
access control system development and policy-based computing. On one hand, the
AMF framework facilitates comprehensive analysis and thorough realization of for-
mal access control models in secure system development. I demonstrate how this
method can be applied to build role-based access control systems by adopting the
NIST/ANSI RBAC standard as an underlying security model. On the other hand,
the AMF framework ensures the correctness of access control policies in policy-
based computing through automated reasoning techniques and anomaly manage-
ment mechanisms. A systematic method is presented to formulate XACML in
Answer Set Programming (ASP) that allows users to leverage off-the-shelf ASP
solvers for a variety of analysis services. In addition, I introduce a novel anomaly
management mechanism, along with a grid-based visualization approach, which
enables systematic and effective detection and resolution of policy anomalies. I
further evaluate the AMF framework through modeling and analyzing multiparty
access control in Online Social Networks (OSNs). A MultiParty Access Control
(MPAC) model is formulated to capture the essence of multiparty authorization re-
quirements in OSNs. In particular, I show how AMF can be applied to OSNs for
identifying and resolving privacy conflicts, and representing and reasoning about
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MPAC model and policy. To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methodol-
ogy, a suite of proof-of-concept prototype systems is implemented as well.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The advent of emerging technologies such as service-oriented architecture and cloud
computing has enabled users to perform business services more efficiently and ef-
fectively. However, we still suffer from unintended security leakages by unautho-
rized actions in business services while providing more convenient services to users
through such a cutting-edge technological growth. Access control is one of the most
fundamental and pervasive mechanisms in use today to secure these services.
There have been two parallel areas in access control research in recent years.
On one hand, there are efforts to develop access control models to fulfil the autho-
rization requirements from real-world application domains. These have turned out
several successful and well-established access control models, such as the RBAC96
model [1], the NIST/ANSI standard RBAC model [2, 3], the RT model [4], and
the Usage Control model [5]. In parallel, and almost separately, many researchers
have devoted to develop policy languages for access control to support policy-based
computing, including application-level policies (e.g., XACML [6], SAML [7], Pon-
der [8] and EPAL [9]), network-level policies (e.g., firewall policy [10] and IPSec
policy [11]), and system-level policies (e.g., SELinux policy [12] and AppArmor
policy [13]).
Software developers utilize models extensively, particularly in the early
software development lifecycle to improve software quality. Since security has
become a necessary part of nearly most modern software and information systems,
access control models can be leveraged to integrate the security concerns into the
software development process [14, 15]. However, several challenging issues should
be taken into account for applying access control models in secure system develop-
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ments. First, there exists a gap between access control models and building secure
systems with such formal models. Access control models are generally described in
some forms of formalism, but software developers are often reluctant to fully adopt
a formal model for their development tasks. Consequently, it is very desirable to
have a mechanism and corresponding tool to aid software developers or system ad-
ministrators in understanding and articulating a specific access control model in the
software analysis and design phases. Second, it is crucial to verify and validate
the access control models and associated constraints before actual implementation
commences, such that flaws and conflicts in the system design can thus be iden-
tified as early as possible, and can be efficiently resolved accordingly. Third, the
access control models that are specified with modeling languages should be trans-
lated to security enforcement codes to derive appropriate security properties for the
system implementation. Besides, the consistency between the design model and its
implementation, and the correctness of the translation should be evaluated.
On the other hand, the use of a policy-based approach has recently received
considerable attention to accommodate the security requirements covering large,
open, distributed and heterogeneous computing environments [6, 8, 10, 12]. Policy-
based computing handles complex system properties by separating policies from
system implementation and enabling dynamic adaptability of system behaviors by
changing policy configurations without reprogramming the systems. Considering
that most recent policy language proposals supporting complicated and distributed
systems, assuring the correctness of policy specifications becomes a crucial and yet
challenging task. Especially, identifying inconsistencies and differences between
policy specifications and their expected functions is critical since the correctness
of the implementation and enforcement of policies heavily relies on the policy
specification. Consequently, the increasing complexity of policy-based comput-
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ing strongly demands automated analysis techniques. Without having such analysis
techniques in place, most benefits of policy-based techniques and declarative policy
languages may be in vain.
Even though some approaches have been proposed from various aspects to
address the issues with respect to the representation and verification of access con-
trol models [14, 16, 17, 18, 19], as well as the analysis and management of access
control policies [20, 21, 22, 23, 24], the preliminary study in this work clearly iden-
tifies that there is a need to design a systematic mechanism that is general and flexi-
ble enough to reflect and deal with the various assurancemanagement requirements
rising from both access control system development and policy-based computing.
In this research, I would make one step towards this direction. In this dissertation,
I define the concept of assurance as “the process-driven management for access
control systems from formal representation to practical enforcement that ensures
the correctness and conformance of access control systems”.
1.1 Statement of the Hypothesis
Therefore, this research hypothesizes that:
Systematic analysis and practical realization of access control models and
policies are necessary to articulate assurance relevant requirements, such as cor-
rectness and conformance of access control systems, and to accommodate these
requirements for achieving the assurance of access control systems.
In this dissertation, I introduce an AssuranceManagement Framework (AMF),
which enables formal access control models are fully realized in real systems via
model representation, constraint specification, and generation of enforcement codes.
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Thus, the gap between access control models and the development of access control
systems can be minimized. Particularly, model-based verification and model-based
testing for access control are articulated in this framework, in which the formal
specifications of access control models and constraints are verified, and test cases
are derived from the formal specifications automatically. The generated test cases
are used to validate whether the secure system design and implementation conform
to the formal specifications. Consequently, the analysis and testing of access con-
trol models in the AMF framework could provide higher assurance for the design
and implementation of access control systems. I then adopt the NIST/ANSI RBAC
standard [2] to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach. An RBAC
authorization environment RAE and a simulation system RASS are implemented as
well, and they can cooperate with Alloy Analyzer [25] to accommodate features
addressed in the framework.
Besides, the AMF framework ensures the correctness of access control poli-
cies for policy-based computing by adopting automated reasoning techniques and
systematic anomaly management mechanisms. I present a logic-based policy man-
agement approach for access control policies especially focusing on XACML (eX-
tensible Access Control Markup Language) policies [6]. Answer Set Programming
(ASP) [26, 27] is adopted to formulate XACML policies that allows users to lever-
age the features of ASP solvers in performing various logical reasoning and analysis
tasks such as policy verification, comparison and querying. Moreover, I introduce
a policy-based segmentation technique to accurately identify policy anomalies and
derive effective anomaly resolutions, along with an intuitive visualization represen-
tation of analysis results. In addition, I discuss the implementation of an anomaly
analysis tool called XAnalyzer and demonstrate how the proposed approach can
efficiently discover and resolve policy anomalies.
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I further evaluate the applicability of the AMF framework through modeling
and analyzing multiparty access control in Online Social Networks (OSNs). AMul-
tiParty Access Control (MPAC) model is formulated to capture the core features of
multiparty authorization requirements which have not been accommodated so far
by existing access control systems and models for OSNs (e.g., [28, 29, 30, 31]).
In the meanwhile, since privacy conflicts are inevitable in multiparty authorization,
a systematic mechanism is provided to identify and resolve privacy conflicts for
collaborative data sharing in OSNs. In particular, the conflict resolution indicates
a tradeoff between privacy protection and data sharing by quantifying privacy risk
and sharing loss. Moreover, I introduce an approach for representing and reasoning
about MPAC model and policy with ASP. I also discuss a proof-of-concept proto-
type implementation of the proposed approach called Retinue and provide system
evaluation and usability study of the methodology.
1.2 Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses re-
lated work. Chapter 3 provides background on several technologies. Chapter 4
overviews the AMF framework, elaborates the processes of the analysis and real-
ization of access control model in AMF, and addresses the techniques of the policy
reasoning and anomaly management in AMF. Chapter 5 articulates how to apply the
AMF framework to OSNs through modeling and analyzing multiparty access con-
trol. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this dissertation and presents some directions
for future work.
5
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, I summarize the related work to this dissertation.
2.1 Representation and Analysis of Access Control Model
Many research efforts have been devoted to UML-based modeling of security model.
Ahn et al. [16] showed how RBAC model and constraints can be expressed in UML
using OCL. Ju¨rjens et al. [32] proposed an extension to UML that defines several
new stereotypes towards formal security verification of elements. Alghathbar et
al. [33] defined an approach AuthUML that includes a process and a modeling lan-
guage to express RBAC policies via use cases. Ray et al. [15] specified reusable
RBAC policies using UML diagram templates and showed how RBAC policies can
be easily integrated with the application. Basin et al. [14] defined a metamodel
to generate security definition languages, an instance of which is SecureUML, a
platform-independent language for RBAC. Mouheb et al. [34] presented an aspect-
oriented modeling approach for specifying and integrating security concerns into
UML design models. All of these approaches accommodated security requirements
without considering the validation of security model and policy.
One important aspect of access control model analysis is to formally check
general properties of access control. In formal verification, a formal specification
of a system is proven with a set of higher-level properties that the system should
satisfy [35]. Currently, formal verification offers a rich toolbox containing a variety
of techniques such as model checking [36], SAT solving [37] and theorem prov-
ing [38], for supporting automatic system verification. Schaad and Moffett [17]
specified the access control policies under the RBAC96 and ARBAC97 model and
a set of separation of duty constraints in Alloy. They attempted to check the con-
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straint violations caused by administrative operations. In [39], Shafig et al. ex-
plored a Petri-Net based framework to verify the correctness of event-driven RBAC
policies in real-time system. Toahchoodee et al. [40] demonstrated how the spatio-
temporal aspects in RBAC model can be verified with Alloy. Alloy is also adopted
to analyze the formal specifications of an RBAC model and constraints, which are
then used for access control system development. In addition, the verified specifica-
tions are used to automatically derive the test cases for conformance testing. In [18],
Shor et al. demonstrated how the USE tool, a validation tool for OCL constraints,
can be utilized to validate authorization constraints against RBAC configurations.
The policy designers can employ the USE-based approach to detect certain conflicts
between authorization constraints and to identify missing constraints. However, the
USE tool mainly focuses on the analysis of OCL constraints and has limitations
for specifying models and policies. Similarly, Basin et al. [19] showed security-
design models represented with UML and OCL can be validated based on system
scenarios, which represent possible run-time instances of systems.
In conformance testing [41], an actual implementation of a system is com-
pared with its specification by means of interactions between the implementation
and test cases. The most significant recent development in testing is the applica-
tion of verification approach which generates test cases from the formal specifica-
tions [42, 43]. However, very few studies addressed how access control mechanisms
could be tested. Recently, mutation analysis was applied to security policy testing.
Masood et al. [44] used formal techniques to conceive a fault model and adopt
mutation for RBAC models. Xie et al. [45] proposed a fault model for XACML
policies. The mutation operators were introduced to implement the fault model.
Pretschner et al. [46] also used mutation analysis and defined security policy mu-
tation operators in order to improve the security tests. However, no existing work
7
could adopt formal verification technologies for test case generation for the purpose
of checking the compliance of access control system design and implementation.
2.2 Representation and Analysis of Access Control Policy
Many research efforts have been devoted to the policy representation and analysis.
I only overview some work closely related to this dissertation, mainly focusing on
representing and analyzing XACML policies.
Representing and Reasoning about Access Control Policy
In [47], a framework for automated verification of access control policies based on
relational first-order logic was proposed. The authors demonstrated how XACML
policies can be translated to the Alloy language [48], and checked their security
properties using the Alloy Analyzer. However, using the first-order constructs of
Alloy to model XACML policies is expensive and still needs to examine its feasi-
bility for larger size of policies. In [49], the authors formalized XACML policies
using a process algebra known as Communicating Sequential Processes. This uti-
lizes a model checker to formally verify properties of policies, and to compare
access control policies with each other. Fisler et al. [20] introduced an approach to
represent XACML policies with Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTB-
DDs). A policy analysis tool called Margrave was developed. Margrave can verify
XACML policies against the given properties and perform change-impact analysis
based on the semantic differences between the MTBDDs representing the policies.
Kolovski et al. [21] presented a formalization of XACML using description logic
(DL), which is a family of languages that are decidable subsets of first-order logic,
and leveraged existing DL reasoners to conduct policy verification. However, ex-
isting work could only address part of XACML combining algorithms. Also, none
of them could handle conditions represented in XACML policies.
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Anomaly Discovery and Resolution for Access Control Policy
Several work presented policy analysis tools with the goal of discovering policy
anomalies in firewall [22, 23, 24, 50, 51]. However, we cannot directly apply those
analysis approaches for XACML due to several reasons. First, the structure of
firewall policies is flat but XACML has a hierarchical structure supporting recursive
policy specification. Second, a firewall policy only supports one conflict resolution
strategy (first-match) but XACML has four rule/policy combining algorithms. Last
but not the least, a firewall rule is typically specified with fixed fields, while an
XACML rule can be multi-valued.
Some XACML policy evaluation engines, such as Sun PDP [52] and XEngine
[53], have been developed to handle the process of evaluating whether a request sat-
isfies an XACML policy. During the process of policy enforcement, conflicts can
be checked if a request matches multiple rules having different effects, and then
conflicts are resolved by applying predefined combining algorithms in the policy.
Some work addressed the general conflict resolution mechanisms for access
control [54, 55, 56, 57, 58]. Especially, Li et al. [56] proposed a policy combining
language PCL, which can be utilized to specify a variety of user-defined combin-
ing algorithms for XACML. In addition, Bauer et al. [59] adopted a data-mining
technique to eliminate inconsistencies between access control policies and user’s
intentions.
Other related work includes XACML policy integration [60, 61] and XACML
policy optimization [62]. Since anomaly discovery and resolution are challenging
issues in policy integration and redundancy elimination can contribute in policy
optimization, all of those related work are orthogonal to this work.
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Visualization-based Policy Representation
There are several interfaces that have been developed to assist users in creating
and manipulating security policies. Expandable Grid is a tool for viewing and au-
thoring access control policies [63]. The representation in Expandable Grids is a
matrix with subjects shown along the rows, resources shown along the columns,
and effective accesses for the combinations of subjects and resources in the matrix
cells. The SPARCLE Policy Workbench allows policy authors to construct policies
in a natural language interface, which are in turn translated into machine-readable
policies [64]. Even though these interfaces are useful for authoring access control
policies, they cannot effectively represent the results of policy analysis. Moreover,
visualization has been widely used in the security arena for better understanding and
presenting data related to network attacks [65, 66], intrusion detection [67, 68], and
trust negotiations [69]. However, it is rarely adopted for security policy analysis.
2.3 Access Control for Online Social Networks
Access control for OSNs is still a relatively new research area. Several proposals of
an access control scheme for OSNs have been introduced (e.g., [28, 29, 30, 31, 70]).
Carminati et al. [28] introduced a trust-based access control mechanism, which al-
lows the specification of access rules for online resources where authorized users
are denoted in terms of the relationship type, depth, and trust level between users
in OSNs. They further presented a semi-decentralized discretionary access control
system and a related enforcement mechanism for controlled sharing of information
in OSNs [29]. Fong et al. [31] proposed an access control model that formalizes and
generalizes the access control mechanism implemented in Facebook. Gates [71] de-
scribed relationship-based access control as one of the new security paradigms that
addresses the requirements of theWeb 2.0. Then, Fong [30] recently formulated this
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paradigm called a Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) that bases autho-
rization decisions on the relationships between the resource owner and the resource
accessor in an OSN. However, none of these work could accommodate privacy con-
trol requirements with respect to the collaborative data sharing in OSNs.
Recently, semantic web technologies have been used to model and express
fine-grained access control policies for OSNs (e.g., [72, 73, 74]). Especially, Carmi-
nati et al. [72] proposed a semantic web based framework for social network access
control. Three types of policies are defined in this framework, including autho-
rization policy, filtering policy and admin policy, which are modeled with the Web
Ontology Language (OWL) and the SemanticWeb Rule Language (SWRL). Access
control policies regulate how resources can be accessed by the participants; filter-
ing policies specify how resources have to be filtered out when a user fetches an
OSN page; and admin policies can determine who is authorized to specify policies.
Although they claimed that flexible admin policies are needed to bring the system
to a scenario where several access control policies specified by distinct users can
be applied to the same resource, however, lack of formal descriptions and concrete
implementation of the proposed approach leaves behind the ambiguities of their
solution.
Several recent work [75, 76, 77, 78, 79] recognized the need of joint man-
agement for data sharing, especially photo sharing, in OSNs. In particular, Squic-
ciarini et al. [78] proposed a solution for collective privacy management for photo
sharing in OSNs. This work considered the privacy control of a content that is co-
owned by multiple users in an OSN, such that each co-owner may separately specify
her/his own privacy preference for the shared content. The Clarke-Tax mechanism
was adopted to enable the collective enforcement for shared content. Game theory
was applied to evaluate the scheme. However, a general drawback of this solution
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is the usability issue, as it could be very hard for ordinary OSN users to compre-
hend the Clarke-Tax mechanism and specify appropriate bid values for auctions. In
addition, the auction process adopted in their approach indicates only the winning
bids could determine who was able to access the data, instead of accommodating
all stakeholders’ privacy preferences.
Measuring privacy risk in OSNs has been addressed recently by several
work [80, 81, 82]. Becker et al. [80] presented PrivAware, a tool to detect and re-
port unintended information loss through quantifying privacy risk associated with
friend relationship in OSNs. In [82], Talukder et al. discussed a privacy protection
tool, called Privometer, which can measure the risk of potential privacy leakage
cased by malicious applications installed in the user’s friend profiles and suggest
self-sanitization actions to lessen this leakage accordingly. Liu et al. [81] proposed
a framework to compute the privacy score of a user, indicating the user’s potential
risk caused by her/his participation in OSNs. Their solution also focused on the
privacy settings of users with respect to their profile items.
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Chapter 3
Background Information
This chapter gives a brief introduction to several relevant technologies.
3.1 Role-Based Access Control Standard
RBAC standard was proposed by National Institute of Standards and Technologies
(NIST) in 2001 [2] and formally adopted as an ANSI standard in 2004 [3]. The
NIST/ANSI RBAC standard is composed of two parts: RBAC Reference Model
and RBAC System and Administrative Functional Specification. The reference
model defines sets of basic RBAC elements and relations, such as a set of roles,
a set of users, a set of permissions, and relationships between users, roles, and
permissions. The system and administrative functional specification identifies all
necessary functionalities required by role-based systems. These functionalities are
divided into three categories: administrative operations, administrative reviews, and
supporting system functions. In addition, the NIST/ANSI RBAC standard has four
components: Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, Static Separation of Duty (SSoD)
relations, and Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSoD) relations. In this dissertation, I
adopt this standard model as a basis for the model representation.
3.2 Unified Modeling Language and Object Constraint Language
Unified Modeling Language (UML) [83] is a general-purpose visual modeling lan-
guage in which we can specify, visualize, and document the artifacts of software
systems. It captures decisions and understanding about systems that must be con-
structed. UML has become a standard modeling language in the field of software
engineering. UML defines notions for building many diagrams–such as use case di-
agram, class diagram, collaboration diagram and so on–to depict a particular view
of a system. In this work, I focus on the class diagram and object diagram of UML.
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A class diagram depicts a structural view of information in a system. Classes are
defined in terms of their attributes and relationships. The relationships include as-
sociation, generalization/specialization, and aggregation of classes. An object dia-
gram is an instance of a class diagram. It shows the system states as a collection of
objects at a particular point in time. In this work, I concentrate on class and object
diagrams for representing RBAC model and system configuration, respectively.
The semi-formal semantics of UML has ambiguity and inconsistency is-
sues [84]. Object Constraint Language (OCL) is a constraint expression language
that enables users to describe constraints for UML-based models. OCL constraints
typically specify restrictions that state conditions for all instances of the classes. In
this work, I adopt OCL to specify RBAC policies. OCL offers a number of advan-
tages over the use of UML diagrams for modeling software systems. First, OCL
expressions make the definition of UML graphical models more consistent and pre-
cise. Second, OCL has a formal semantic based on mathematical set theory and
predicate logic. Thus, it is possible to have OCL expressions ensure whether the
model representations are correct and consistent with other elements of the model.
Third, UML diagrams and OCL expressions can be integrated to support model-
driven system development. As pointed out in [85], the OCL can be regarded as a
key ingredient of UML-based model representation.
3.3 Role-Based Constraints Language 2000
Role-based Constraints Language 2000 (RCL2000) [86] is a formal specification
language for RBAC policies and helps identify useful role-based authorization con-
straints such as prohibition, obligation and cardinality constraints. The users of
RCL2000 are security policy designers who understand organizational objectives
and articulate security policies to support these objectives. RCL2000 also provides
n-ary expressions and more flexibility in expressing access control constraints [87].
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RCL2000 has six entity sets called users (U), roles (R), permissions (P), ses-
sions (S), objects (OBJ), and operations (OP). Additional elements used in RCL2000
are three conflicting sets CR, CP and CU. CR is defined as a collection of conflicting
role sets; CP is denoted as a collection of conflicting permission sets; and CU is a
collection of conflicting user sets. RCL2000 supports six RBAC system functions
user, roles, sessions, permissions, operations and object. Also, RCL2000
defines two nondeterministic functions, OE (one element) and AO (all other). The
OE(X) function allows users to get one element from a set X, and AO(X) is used to
get a set by taking out one element. In this work, RCL2000 expressions are used to
specify formal authorization policies derived from the NIST/ANSI RBAC standard.
3.4 Alloy
Alloy [88] is a structural modeling language based on first-order logic, and de-
signed for the specification of object models through graphical and textual structure.
An Alloy model is a structured specification composed with the following com-
ponents: Signature, Fact, Function, Predicate and Assertion. The Alloy
Analyzer [25] is an automated constraint solver for analyzing (verifying and val-
idating) models written in Alloy. Alloy Analyzer provides two kinds of automatic
analysis–simulation in which the consistency of a fact or predicate is demonstrated
by generating a snapshot of the model; and checking in which a consequence of
the specification is tested by attempting to generate a counterexample for an as-
sertion. The former is useful for demonstrating the feasibility of a specification,
where conflicting constraints could be detected, while the latter is for validating the
correctness of a certain property in a system, where the assertion could be proved
based on the facts defined in the model and within a finite scope of instances.
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3.5 Extensible Access Control Markup Language
Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [6] has become the de
facto standard for describing access control policies and offers a large set of built-
in functions, data types, combining algorithms, and standard profiles for defining
application-specific features. At the root of all XACML policies is a policy or a
policy set. A policy set is composed of a sequence of policies or other policy sets
along with a policy combining algorithm and a target. A policy represents a single
access control policy expressed through a target, a set of rules and a rule combining
algorithm. The target defines a set of subjects, resources and actions the policy or
policy set applies to. For an applicable policy or policy set, the corresponding target
should be evaluated to be true; otherwise, the policy or policy set is skipped when
evaluating an access request. A rule set is a sequence of rules. Each rule consists of
a target, a condition, and an effect. The target of a rule decides whether an access
request is applicable to the rule and it has a similar structure as the target of a policy
or a policy set; the condition is a boolean expression to specify restrictions on the
attributes in the target and refine the applicability of the rule; and the effect is either
permit or deny. If an access request satisfies both the target and condition of a
rule, the response is sent with the decision specified by the effect element in the
rule. Otherwise, the response yields NotApplicable which is typically considered
as deny.
3.6 Answer Set Programming
Answer set programming (ASP) [26, 27] is a recent form of declarative program-
ming that has emerged from the interaction between two lines of research — non-
monotonic semantics of negation in logic programming and applications of satis-
fiability solvers to search problems. The idea of ASP is to represent the search
problem we are interested in as a logic program whose intended models, called
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“stable models (a.k.a. answer sets),” correspond to the solutions of the problem,
and then find these models using an answer set solver — a system for computing
stable models. Like other declarative computing paradigms, such as SAT (Satisfia-
bility Checking) and CP (Constraint Programming), ASP provides a common basis
for formalizing and solving various problems, but is distinct from others such that
it focuses on knowledge representation and reasoning: its language is an expressive
nonmonotonic language based on logic programs under the stable model seman-
tics [89, 90], which allows elegant representation of several aspects of knowledge
such as causality, defaults, and incomplete information, and provides compact en-
coding of complex problems that cannot be translated into SAT and CP [91].
As the mathematical foundation of answer set programming, the stable model
semantics was originated from understanding the meaning of negation as failure in
Prolog, which has the rules of the form
a1  a2; : : : ;am;not am+1; : : : ;not an (3.1)
where all ai are atoms and not is a symbol for negation as failure, also known as
default negation. Intuitively, under the stable model semantics, rule (3.1) means that
if you have generated a2; : : : ;am and it is impossible to generate any of am+1; : : : ;an
then you may generate a1. This explanation seems to contain a vicious cycle, but
the semantics are carefully defined in terms of fixpoint.
While it is known that the transitive closure (e.g., reachability) cannot be
expressed in first-order logic, it can be handled in the stable model semantics. Given
the fixed extent of edge relation, the extent of reachable is the transitive closure of
edge.
reachable(X ;Y ) edge(X ;Y ):
reachable(X ;Y ) reachable(X ;Z);reachable(Z;Y ):
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Several extensions were made over the last twenty years. The addition of
cardinality constraints turns out to be useful in knowledge representation. A car-
dinality constraint is of the form lowerfl1; : : : ; lngupper where l1; : : : ; ln are literals
and lower and upper are numbers. A cardinality constraint is satisfied if the num-
ber of satisfied literals in l1; : : : ; ln is in between lower and upper. It is also allowed
to contain variables in cardinality constraints. For instance,
more than one edge(X) 2fedge(X ;Y ) : vertex(Y )g:
means that more than one edge(X) is true if there are at least two edges connect X
with other vertices.
The language also supports choice, counting and aggregates, such as count,
sum, min, and max. For instance, the following rule uses an aggregate to represent
the policy that each referee should be assigned at least 3 proposals but no more than
8 proposals:
3 fassign(R;P) : proposal(P)g  8 re f eree(R):
The language also has useful constructs, such as strong negations, weak con-
straints, and preferences. What distinguishes ASP from other nonmonotonic for-
malisms is the availability of several efficient implementations, answer set solvers,
such as Smodels1, Cmodels2, Clasp3, which led to practical nonmonotonic reason-
ing that can be applied to various level applications.
1http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels.
2http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cmodels.html.
3 http://potassco.sourceforge.net.
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Chapter 4
Assurance Management Framework (AMF)
In this chapter, I first give a brief overview of the assurance management frame-
work. I then discuss approaches in AMF for the realization and analysis of access
control models, and the analysis and management of access control policies.
4.1 Overview
The AMF framework depicted in Figure 4.1 is designed to manage the assurance of
access control systems with respect to both access control model and access control
policy. Regarding access control model, the AMF framework enables realization
and analysis of formal access control models in secure system development. Model
verification and model testing for access control are articulated in this framework,
where the formal specifications of access control models are verified, and test cases
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Figure 4.1: Assurance management framework.
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are derived from the formal specifications automatically. The generated test cases
are in turn used to validate whether the secure system design and implementation
conform to the formal specifications. From the perspective of access control policy,
the AMF framework ensures the correctness of access control policies for policy-
based computing through automated reasoning techniques, and anomaly detection
and resolution mechanisms. A logic-based reasoning approach is adopted for ac-
cess control policies that allows users to leverage the features of logic solvers in
performing various logical reasoning and analysis tasks. In addition, this frame-
work contains a comprehensive anomaly detection and resolution mechanism in-
tegrated with a visualization-based policy representation that facilitates systematic
and effective detection and resolution of access control policy anomalies. Finally,
a suite of tools should be developed to support all features addressed in the AMF
framework.
4.2 Access Control Model
I first address the processes for realizing and analyzing access control models in
the AMF framework, which is shown in Figure 4.2. In the modeling stage, formal
specifications of access control models and constraints are verified. Additionally,
application-oriented authorization model representation and constraint specification
are derived from the formal specifications of access control models and constraints,
which can also be utilized to produce test cases. Then, the generated test cases are
used to validate the application-oriented models and constraints. In the implemen-
tation stage, authorization enforcement codes are generated systematically from the
application-oriented specifications. The correctness and conformance of generated
codes are also evaluated by using the generated test suites. I divide all tasks into
two categories as follows:
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Figure 4.2: Realization and analysis of access control model.
1. Realization of access control model
• Application-oriented representation of access control model and con-
straint. The representation of an access control model and correspond-
ing constraints should enable software engineers to integrate security
aspects into the applications without knowing details of the access con-
trol model. In this regard, a well-designed and general-purpose repre-
sentation should be considered as a means to represent access control
models and constraints in an intuitive fashion.
• Automatic generation of access control enforcement code. It is also a
crucial aspect to make the transparent transition from system design to
secure system implementation. The goal of code generation in AMF
is to automatically generate executable modules from the application-
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oriented specifications of access control models and constraints by a
well-known software engineering mechanism, such as theModel Driven
Development (MDD) [92]. The generated authorization modules would
be eventually integrated into the real systems to achieve an acceptable
degree of assurance in secure system development.
2. Analysis of access control model
• Verification of formal access control model. One of promising advan-
tages in mathematical and logic-based techniques for access control
models is that formal reasoning of the authorization properties can be
performed. Since the formal access control models serve as a basis for
secure system development in AMF, obviously the formal specifications
of models should be proved based on the expected authorization prop-
erties.
• Automatic test case generation from formal specification. While for-
mal verification can prove violation or satisfaction of properties, it is
not sufficient enough to practically guarantee the assurance. The proof
only shows that a given formal specification fulfills a set of properties.
However, we should consider the actual implementation is influenced
by other facts, such as platforms, transformation approaches, compilers,
and so on. Consequently, the implemented modules should be further
tested.
Analysis Approach in AMF for Access Control Model
I introduce a methodology composing formal analysis and conformance testing for
building access control systems. As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, the formal access
control model serves as the core of following tasks: (1) formal verification, (2) sys-
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tem design, and (3) test generation. In this work, both model verification and model
testing are supported by the same formal verification technology for the purposes
of automatic verification and test case generation. A notable advantage of using
model-based approach is to reduce the complexity of analysis, thus minimizing the
state explosion problem.
In order to articulate the methodology clearly, I first define access control
model specification as follows:
Definition 1 (Access Control Model Specification). An access control model spec-
ification M is defined as M = (O;F;C), where
• O is the component representation of an access control model, which defines
sets of basic access control entities and relations;
• F is a set of access control function specifications, which specify the features
required by an access control system; and
• C is a set of access control constraint specifications, which define higher-level
organizational policies.
Access Control Model Verification
I take into account the following verification problem for access control models:
given an access control model specificationM and an access control model property
P, does M satisfy P? I consider two kinds of property, access control functional
property Pf and access control authorization property Pa. Therefore, the verification
of an access control model is decomposed into two steps, access control function
verification and access control constraint verification.
Definition 2 (Access Control Function Verification). For an access control model
specification M = (O;F;C) and an access control functional property Pf , proving
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whether M satisfies Pf , denoted by M  Pf , is called access control function verifi-
cation.
That is, if we can determine that M satisfies Pf , it means the access control
functional property Pf is held on the access control model specification M. Hence,
we can make sure the functional components in a formal model specificationM are
correct with respect to expected properties.
Figure 4.3 illustrates a reasoning process for the formal verification. The
access control model specification M and the functional property Pf are encoded
and then fed into a formal verifier. The verifier in turn checks whether the functional
property is violated or not. If a functional property violation is encountered, it
means the access control model specification does not conform to the functional
property, leading the refinement of model specification.
Figure 4.3: Function verification.
A critical task for specifying constraints is to determine whether a set of
constraint expressions really reflects the desired authorization requirements prop-
erly. Normally, constraints prohibit an action or state occurring in the system. Two
issues should be considered carefully while analyzing a given set of constraints
against the expected authorization requirements. First, constraints may be too weak,
named under-constraint to grant undesired system states. A safety problem (i.e. the
leakage of a right to an unauthorized user) can be resulted from the weak con-
straints. Second, constraints may be too strong, named over-constraint to deny
desired system states. Strong constraints can cause availability problems. For ex-
ample, an entitled user cannot own the right to access a resource.
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A concept of authorization state space is introduced to identify under- and
over-constraints in an access control model specification. An authorization state
space represents an entire space that an access control system probably covers. In
other words, all possible system states of an access control system consist of an
authorization state space. Regarding access control requirements, an authorization
state space can be divided into two subspaces: (1) the desired authorization state
subspace Sd , which contains authorization states that should be allowed to occur
in an access control system according to the authorization requirements. (2) the
undesired authorization state subspace Su, which contains authorization states that
should be prohibited to appear in an access control system against the authoriza-
tion requirements. On one hand, we are able to specify the desired authorization
state subspace with the expected authorization properties Pa+ and the undesired
authorization state subspace with the unexpected authorization properties Pa  , re-
spectively. On the other hand, from the perspective of access control specification,
an authorization state space can be divided into permitted authorization state sub-
space Sp and prohibited/constrained authorization state subspace Sc. The most ideal
view of an authorization state space is that the desired authorization state subspace
is contained by the permitted authorization state subspace, and the undesired autho-
rization state subspace is included in the prohibited authorization state subspace.
It means the specified constraints meet the authorization requirements accordingly.
Unfortunately, the ideal view is far from the reality. Two situations may exist in
practice.
Figure 4.4 depicts one case, which demonstrates that the permitted autho-
rization state subspace Sp covers partial undesired authorization state subspace Su
due to the reason of under-constraint.
25
 Figure 4.4: Identifying under-constraint.
When the prohibited authorization state subspace Sc is a subset of the unde-
sired authorization state subspace Su, and there is an overlap between the permitted
authorization state subspace Sp and the undesired authorization state subspace Su,
under-constraint occurs in the constraint specifications.
 
Figure 4.5: Identifying over-constraint.
Another case is shown in Figure 4.5. Over-constraint is presented in this
case, where the permitted authorization state subspace Sp is covered by the desired
authorization state subspace Sd , and the prohibited authorization state subspace Sc
contains partial desired authorization state subspace Sd .
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Using formal verification, both over- and under-constraints for an access
control model specification are analyzed automatically with a set of given access
control properties. A general definition for access control constraint verification is
given as follows:
Definition 3 (Access Control Constraint Verification). For an access control model
specification M = (O;F;C) and an access control authorization property Pa, prov-
ing whether M satisfies Pa, denoted by M  Pa, is called access control constraint
verification.
In order to identify under-constraint, the unexpected authorization property
Pa  is used to replace Pa, and an expression that addresses the analysis for under-
constraint can be defined as follows: M  Pa  ) C #, where C# denotes under-
constraint.
As demonstrated on the bottom part of the Figure 4.4, if an unexpected au-
thorization property Pa  , which represents the authorization subspace Sp \ Su, is
satisfied by the access control model specification Sc, under-constraint is detected.
Figure 4.6 (a) depicts the processes of constraint verification for determining under-
constraint. If the verifier proves an unexpected authorization property Pa  is held
on the access control model specification M, we conclude that the given constraint
specifications are too weak, and should be strengthened to exclude undesired au-
thorization properties or contain required authorization properties.
Figure 4.6: Constraint verification.
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The expected authorization property Pa+ is utilized to substitute Pa for iden-
tifying over-constraint as summarized in the following expression: M 2 Pa+ ) C
", where C" denotes over-constraint.
The bottom part of the Figure 4.5 depicts the over-constraint situation.
Based on the expression, I introduce processes for identifying over-constraint as
shown in Figure 4.6 (b). If the verifier checks the expected authorization property
Pa+ is not satisfied by access control model specification M, this points out the de-
fined constraints are too strong. Thus, the constraint definitions should be refined
by reducing the restriction of constraints.
Access Control Model Testing
Model-based testing is a software testing method in which the models defined in
software construction are used to drive the testing process. Numerous formal veri-
fication techniques have been used for model-based testing [93]. The idea of auto-
mated test generation from the formal verification is that counterexamples may be
generated to illustrate a property violation by the formal verification, and counterex-
amples are interpreted as test cases. This work intends to use a formal specification
of access control model and constraint to automatically derive test cases for testing
authorization constraints in access control systems.
Figure 4.7: Test case generation for constraints.
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Two kinds of test cases are generated: one is called negative test case, de-
noted as T , which is considered as an undesired access control authorization state
that should be denied by the constraints in an access control system. Another test
case is named positive test case, denoted as T+. This test case represents a desired
access control authorization state, which should be allowed to appear in an access
control system.
The following expression specifies the generation of negative test case based
on the satisfiability verification: (O;F; ) 2C) T . Negative test case T  can be
derived from a formal specification, in which an access control model specification
M
0
= (O;F; ) does not satisfy the constraint specification C as demonstrated in
Figure 4.7 (a). Since the constraint specification C is taken out from the access
control model specification M
0
, the authorization property expressed by constraint
specification is not exactly held on the access control model specification. The
verifier can generate counterexamples, which are then used to construct negative
test cases.
Positive test case T+ is generated from a formal specification, as we draw
the constraint specification C from the access control model specification M
0
=
(O;F; ), and take the negated constraint specification :C as the authorization
property to verify the access control model specification M
0
. Counterexamples are
derived and utilized to build positive test cases. The following expression summa-
rizes this characteristic: (O;F; ) 2 :C) T+. Corresponding process is shown in
Figure 4.7 (b).
Realization and Analysis of RBAC Model
I demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach for constructing role-based
access control systems, leveraging the NIST/ANSI RBAC standard [2, 3] as the
underlying authorization model since it includes most of RBAC features [1] and
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Figure 4.8: Realization and analysis of RBAC model with AMF.
has been widely adopted in information assurance community. Role-based Con-
straints Language 2000 (RCL2000) [86] is utilized to define authorization con-
straints formally in RBAC. As demonstrated in Figure 4.8, the formal access con-
trol model and constraints are the core of the entire processes for serving the fol-
lowing tasks: (1) formal verification, (2) system design, and (3) test generation.
Correspondingly, three high-level access control models–such as verification-based
model, application-oriented model, and test-based model–are constructed based on
the formal model. In this approach, the formal access control model and associ-
ated constraints can be fully translated to application-oriented model representation
and constraint specification, which then generate enforcement codes. Also, both
model-based verification and model-based testing are supported by the same for-
mal verification technology for the purposes of automatic verification and test case
generation.
Realization of RBAC Model
For building an access control system based on a particular access control model,
it is very important to have an application-oriented representation of the access
control model for software engineers. UML is the standard language in modeling
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Figure 4.9: RBAC model representation in UML class diagram.
community and the usage of UML for the representation of security models has
been recommended [94]. Furthermore, in order to make RCL2000 expressions
more meaningful to ordinary system developers, this method translates RCL2000-
based constraints into OCL specifications which are closely coupled with UML.
Then UML-based modeling and OCL specifications are facilitated to automatically
generate system modules, called RBAC enforcement codes which can be deployed
in an RBAC-centric system implementation.
RBAC Model Representation in UML and OCL The NIST/ANSI RBAC stan-
dard defines three models: Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC and Constrained RBAC.
The Constrained RBAC in the standard adds separation of duty relations. However,
there are two limitations in the Constrained RBACmodel. First, the SoD constraints
in the standard are applied only to the activation of roles without considering other
components in RBAC model. Second, the standard defines Static SoD (SSoD) re-
lations with respect to user-role assignments over pairs of roles and Dynamic SoD
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(DSoD) relations with the aspect of role activation in a user’s session. These two
constraints in the standard mainly reflect the simplest separation of duty properties.
More fine-grained constraints cannot be defined adequately. Thus special constraint
specification languages are desirable to provide much richer expression for RBAC
constraints. To reduce these limitations, I extend the Constrained RBAC to consider
all aspects of role-based constraints and specify separation of duty constraints with
RCL2000 where a variety of separation of duty properties can be expressed.
Figure 4.9 shows a UML class diagram which depicts a complete represen-
tation of the NIST/ANSI RBAC model including Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC
and Constrained RBAC. The representation can be decomposed to partially support
Core RBAC or different compositions of three reference models. It contains classes,
relationships between classes, and cardinalities in relationships. The basic entities
are user, role, permission, and session classes. The permission class is represented
as a composition of operation and object classes. The role hierarchy relationship is
reflected in role class as a recursive relationship. The standard RBAC model only
supports two separation of duty relations: SSoD and DSoD relations. As discussed
above, constraints should be applied to all RBAC entities. Thus, in the model rep-
resentation, I introduce two components such as SCR (Static Conflicting Roles)
and DCR (Dynamic Conflicting Roles) that support SSoD and DSoD relations in
the standard. Four new components SCP, DCP, SCU and DCU are created to sup-
port constraints in other RBAC entities such as permissions and users. These six
components have dependency relationships with corresponding RBAC components
in UML class diagram and are utilized by constraint expressions to identify more
fine-grained SoD constraints.
The functional specification in the standard defines various functions that
role-based systems should provide. Since I use an object-oriented approach to ex-
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press these functionalities of the standard, some subtle changes must be conducted
in the definition of each function. For example, the RBAC standard defines two
functions, AddInheritance and AddAscendant, to support building a new role
inheritance relationship in role hierarchy. The standard explains AddInheritance
is used to establish a new immediate inheritance relationship between two existing
roles and AddAscendant is used to create a new role and to add this new roles as
an immediate ascendant of an existing role. In object-oriented system design, every
function is attached to a class. Therefore, the function AddInheritance cannot be
used as a single class (role class in the model representation). On the other hand,
since CreateRole function can be implicitly derived from role class in the UML
class diagram at the implementation stage, AddAscendant may not include the op-
eration for creating a new role. In the model representation, I define a function
named AddSenior which adds an immediate senior role object to current role ob-
ject instead of adopting two functions proposed in the standard. For role hierarchy,
I also add two review functions AllSeniors and AllJuniors to query all seniors
and juniors of a role object, because these two functions can frequently be called
by many other functions, as well as by constraints in the presence of role hierar-
chy. Similarly, several review functions related to role hierarchy are added into the
model representation. For example, two review functions, AuthorizedRoles and
AuthorizedUsers, for a permission to find a set of roles that authorize the given
permission and to get a set of users that can authorize the given permission through
their roles, respectively. For brevity, I elaborate a few typical functional definitions
of three components in the standard and corresponding OCL-based definitions.
A. Functional definition of Core RBAC
Administrative commands: These commands are for the creation and
maintenance of RBAC element sets and relations by administrators. The func-
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tions for adding and deleting an element such as AddRole and DeleteRole can
be created from UML class diagrams in the implementation step. A command
specification for AssignUser is defined with OCL as follow:
context Role::AssignUser(u:User)
pre : self.user->excludes(u)
post: self.user->includes(u)
Deassigning a user is symmetric to adding a user, the following is the defi-
nition of DeassignUser. We can also define GrantPermission and
RevokePermission in the same way.
context Role::DeassignUser(u:User)
pre : self.user->includes(u)
post: self.user->excludes(u)
Review functions: These functions are for administrators to query RBAC
element sets and relations. Query operations do not change system states and they
return a value or a set of values. In OCL, they are defined as a body expression.
The following OCL definition supports a review function AssignedUsers:
context Role::AssignedUsers():Set(User)
body: self.user->asSet()
Similarly, the definition of UserPermissions with OCL as follows:
context User::UserPermissions():Set(Permission)
body: self.role.permission->asSet()
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Supporting system functions: The functions are applied to create and
maintain RBAC dynamic properties with regard to users’ sessions and access con-
trol decisions. CreateSession creates a session for a user. The specification is
below:
context User::CreateSession():Session
post: result.oclIsNew() and self.session->includes(result)
CheckAccess checks whether an operation on an object is allowed to be
performed in a particular session. OCL representation for this function is defined
as follows:
context Session::CheckAccess(op:Operation, ob:Object):Boolean
pre : true
post: self.SessionRoles()->exists(r|r.permission
->exits(p|p.operation->includes(op)
and p.object->includes(ob)))
B. Functional definition of Hierarchical RBAC
As illustrated in Figure 4.9, we have four major functions such as AddSenior,
DeleteSenior, AddJunior and DeleteJunior, which are used for administrators
to maintain inheritance relationships among roles. I define AddSeniors in OCL as
follows:
context Role::AddSeniors(r:Role)
pre : self.senior->excludes(r)
post: self.senior->includes(r)
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I define two new review functions AllSeniors and AllJuniors for role hi-
erarchy. The following definition is for AllSeniors, which is a recursive definition
with OCL.
context Role::AllSeniors():Set(Role)
body: self.senior->union(self.senior->
collect(r|r.AllSeniors()))->asSet()
AllSeniors and AllJuniors, are very useful for other functions and con-
straints in presence of role hierarchy. The following is an example in applying
AllSeniors to the definition of AuthorizedRoles for user component in RBAC.
context User::AuthorizedRoles():Set(Role)
body: Role.allInstances()->select(r|
r.AllSeniors()->including(r)->
exists(r1|self.role->includes(r1)))
Note that the definition of AuthorizedRoles should be carefully formu-
lated to reflect the role inheritance with respect to user and session components
using AllSeniors and with respect to permission component using AllJuniors.
The definition of
AuthorizedRoles for permission is given as follows:
context Permission::AuthorizedRoles():Set(Role)
body: Role.allInstances()->select(r|
r.AllJuniors()->including(r)->
exists(r1|self.role->includes(r1)))
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C. Functional definition of Constrained RBAC
In this approach, the definitions related to constraint expressions are incor-
porated with corresponding components in UML-based model representation. I
introduce two new system functions CheckStaticConstraints and
CheckDynamicConstraints for RBAC model to enforce constraint expressions
and to check conflicts. The functions for constraint checking can be used by other
related functions in RBAC model as well1. The following two definitions are for
AssignUser and AddActiveRole functions, respectively.
context Role::AssignUser(u:User)
pre : self.user->excludes(u)
post: self.user->includes(u) and
if (self.CheckStaticConstraints()->
isEmpty()) or
(u.CheckStaticConstraints()->isEmpty())
then
self.user->excludes(u)
endif
In AssignUser, the assignment operation can affect the status of two ob-
jects, user and role objects. Hence, the static constraints for user and role classes
need be enforced at the same time to prevent possible conflicts resulted from the
assignment operation.
1For example, AssignUser and GrantPermission utilize CheckStaticConstraints
to check the static assignment relations, and CreateSession and AddActiveRole employ
CheckDynamicConstraints to check dynamic attributes related to sessions.
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context Session::AddActiveRole(r:Role)
pre : self.user.role->includes(r) and
self.role->excludes(r)
Post: self.role->includes(r) and
if (self.CheckDynamicConstraints()->
isEmpty()) or (self.user.
CheckDynamicConstraints()->isEmpty())
then
self.role->excludes(r)
endif
AddActiveRole can also bring the effect to both a session and a user who
invokes the session. CheckDynamicConstraints for session and user classes
should be performed in AddActiveRole to avoid possible violations of constraints.
RBAC Constraint Specification in OCL In NIST/ANSI RBAC standard, SSoD
constraints are defined with two arguments: a role set rs that includes two or more
roles, and a natural number n, called the cardinality, with the property that 2 n
jrsj which means a user can be assigned to more than equal to two roles and fewer
than the size of role set rs. The similar definition is used in DSoD constraints
with respect to the activation of roles in sessions. The definition of constraints
in the standard has limitations. To overcome such obstacles for considering other
components in RBAC, I use RCL2000 that defines three sets, CR, CP and CU, as the
collections for conflicting role sets, conflicting permission sets and conflicting user
sets, respectively. Each conflicting set can include two or more elements. However,
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there is no notation for the cardinality attribute in conflicting sets itself. Normally,
we can regard the cardinality number n in RCL2000 always greater than equal to
two for each conflicting set. In order to support a more general cardinality property
defined in the standard, I extend the definition for CR, CP and CU in RCL2000
to support the cardinality attribute. In addition, two new functions, GetSet and
GetCardinality, are defined in RCL2000 to allow to get the conflicting element
set and the cardinality number. I usually write GetSet as GS and GetCardinality
as GC in constraint expressions. As discussed before, I also extend CR to SCR and
DCR, CP to SCP and DCP, and CU to SCP and DCP, to support SSoD constraints
and DSoD constraints separately.
Policy designers can employ RCL2000 to specify complex authorization
policies to meet high-level security requirements along with the NIST/ANSI RBAC
standard. The next important step is that RCL2000 policy specifications need to be
realized in UML-based RBAC representation which, in turn, we need to translate
RCL2000 expressions to OCL expressions.
RCL2000 has two nondeterministic functions, OE and AO. The OE(X) func-
tion allows users to get one element from a set X. Multiple occurrences of OE(X) in
a single RCL2000 expression all select the same element from a set X. With AO(X)
we can get a set by taking out one element, thus we can express AO(X) as X -
fOE(X)g. The OE function can be converted to an OCL expression with any opera-
tion. For example, OE(X) can be translated to X->any(true). Then AO(X) can be
correspondingly translated to X-fX->any(true)g.
RCL2000 supports six RBAC system functions user, roles, sessions,
permissions, operations and object. These function expressions can be simply
represented in OCL. For example, roles(u), which returns all the roles assigned
to the user u, can be converted to u.role. In RCL2000, roles and permissions
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Figure 4.10: Translation algorithm from RCL2000 to OCL.
are defined as a variant of roles and permissions to support role hierarchy.
For example, roles(u) returns a set of roles for which a given user is autho-
rized. In the previous section, I have defined several review functions. Using
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such definitions, roles and permissions functions can be translated. For exam-
ple, roles(u) and permission(r) are converted to AuthorizedRoles(u) and
AuthorizedPermissions(r).
Each term in RCL2000 is converted to corresponding OCL operator or func-
tion. For example, operators like 6=,,,), and ^ are replaced by<>,<=,>=,
implies, and and operations correspondingly; 2, \, and [ can be expressed by
include, intersection and union functions in OCL respectively. The detailed
translation algorithm is described in Figure 4.10.
Next, I illustrate two typical RBAC constraints specified in RCL2000, and
give equivalent OCL expressions generated by the translation algorithm.
Constraint 1: (SSoD-CR): The number of conflicting roles, which are from
the same conflicting role set, authorized to a user cannot exceed the cardinality
number of the conflicting role set.
RCL2000 Expression:
j roles(OE(U))\GS(OE(SCR)) j GC(OE(SCR))
Translated OCL Expression:
context User
inv: let
scr:SCR = SCR.allInstances()->any(true)
in
self.AuthorizedRoles()->intersection(scr.
RoleSet)->size() <=scr.SetCardinality
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Table 4.1: Mapping RCL2000 expression to OCL expression for SSoD-CR.
RCL2000 OCL Meaning
OE(SCR)
scr:SCR = SCR. a collection which is a pairs of a
allInstances()->any(true) conflicting role set and a cardinality
for the conflicting role set
OE(U) self a single user
roles*(OE(U)) self.AuthorizedRoles()
return all roles that are authorized to a
single user considering role hierarchy
GS(OE(SCR)) scr.RoleSet return a conflicting role set
GC(OE(SCR)) scr.SetCardinality return the cardinality of a conflicting role set
\ intersection return the intersection of two sets
j set j set->size() return the cardinality number of a set
Table 4.1 explains the mapping from the RCL2000 expression to the OCL
expression for this constraint. All components in the RCL2000-based constraint
expression can be mapped to corresponding OCL components precisely.
Constraint 2: (User-based DSoD):The number of conflicting roles, which
are from the same conflicting role set, activated directly (or indirectly via inheri-
tance) by a user cannot exceed the cardinality number of the conflicting role set.
RCL2000 Expression:
j roles(sessions(OE(U)))\GS(OE(DCR)) j GC(OE(DCR))
Translated OCL Expression:
context User
inv: let
dcr:DCR = DCR.allInstances()->any(true)
in
self.session.AuthorizedRoles()->
intersection(dcr.RoleSet)->size()
<=dcr.SetCardinality
42
Code Generation The code generation part of the approach enables users to build
a real application by creating a platform independent model and then transforming
it to platform dependent codes. The objective for code generation is to generate
security enforcement codes with some degree of assurance based on model speci-
fication represented by UML and OCL. As I addressed in the previous section, all
model components and constraints are evaluated so the enforcement codes gener-
ated from the model representation should fully reflect features and functionalities
of a formal security model, especially the NIST/ANSI RBAC standard in this arti-
cle. Although I select the Java language as the target language in the framework,
I believe this approach can be extended for other languages as well. The process
of mapping model specification to enforcement codes could be performed by the
adoption of the tools such as Octopus [95] and Dresden OCL toolkit [96]. Due to
the page limitation, I omit the discussion of the details of general transformation
process from UML and OCL to Java codes. Instead, I only discuss several critical
issues related to the transformation process.
In the specification of RBAC model, RBAC model elements and relations
are defined using the UML class diagrams and the functionalities and constraints
of RBAC model are specified with OCL expressions. To implement UML model
elements, the classes, attributes, operations and associations need to be translated
into corresponding Java classes or operations. Then, each class in the model is
mapped to one Java class; an operation for the class is created by one operation in
Java class; and an attribute and its association with the class in the model generate a
private class member and get and set operations in the Java class. Also, the basic
types of OCL are mapped to corresponding Java types. For example, Real in OCL
is mapped to float in Java. OCL collection type is implemented as a library using
Set or List of Java language. It is a little complicated when implementing this
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Figure 4.11: Generated Java code for CheckStaticConstraints function.
library, because OCL collections have a large amount of predefined operations, such
as select and collect. These operations need be defined as standard operations
using Java. Based on the implemented standard OCL library, OCL expressions can
directly generate Java codes.
In the implementation, two special system functions, CheckStaticConstr-
aints and CheckDynamicConstraints, for Constrained RBAC are created au-
tomatically to collect and enforce static and dynamic constraint expressions re-
spectively for corresponding components. While we can use a universal function,
such as a CheckConstraints function, to check all constraints for one compo-
nent, for the purpose of making checking procedures more efficient, I provide two
system functions for constraint checking. Session-related constraint expressions
are performed by CheckDynamicConstraints, and other constraints are enforced
by CheckStaticConstraints. Figure 4.11 shows the generated Java codes for
CheckStaticConstraints function of user class. Note that CheckStaticConst-
raints function includes the codes for checking two static SoD constraints with CR
and CU as well.
Analysis of RBAC Model
I utilize a SAT solver as an underlying formal verification technique to demonstrate
automatic analysis and test generation for the formal specifications of an RBAC
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model and associated constraints based on the approaches and definitions intro-
duced in Section 4.2. Alloy [88] is used as an intermediate language into which
the RBAC model is constructed and the RCL2000-based constraints are translated.
Then, using Alloy tool called Alloy Analyzer [25], which uses a SAT solver that
supports enumeration, the RBAC model and corresponding constraints are ana-
lyzed, and test cases are generated from the RBAC model specifications.
RBAC Model Representation in Alloy The NIST/ANSI standard for RBAC
gives an RBAC reference model, which defines sets of basic RBAC elements and
relations, including a set of roles, a set of users, a set of permissions, relationships
between users, roles, and permissions. I define a primary representation of the
NIST/ANSI RBAC model in Alloy as follows:
module RBAC
sig User fg
sig Role fg
sig Operation fg
sig Object fg
sig Permission fOperation, Objectg
sig Session fg
sig URA f
ura: User->Roleg
sig PRA f
pra: Permission->Roleg
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sig US f
us: User!->Sessiong
sig SR f
sr: Session->Roleg
sig PB f
pb: Operation->Objectg
The above defines the core element sets and relations in an RBAC model. A
role hierarchy relation supporting hierarchical RBAC is defined as follows:
sig RRA f
hierarchy: Role->Roleg
To specify SSoD relations and DSoD relations in the context of conflicting
roles, which are addressed in the NIST/ANSI RBAC model, I give the following
Alloy definitions 2:
sig SCR f
conflict role: set Role,
cardinality: Intg
sig DCR f
conflict role: set Role,
cardinality: Intg
2The separation of duty relations in the NIST/ANSI RBAC model can be extended to support
conflicting permissions and conflicting users, using several definitions such as fSCP, DCPg and
fSCU, DCUg, respectively.
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RBAC Constraint Specification in Alloy In order to reason about RCL2000
policy specifications using Alloy tool, we need to translate RCL2000 policy ex-
pressions to Alloy statements. Similar to the translation from RCL2000 to OCL,
six RBAC system functions user, roles, sessions, permissions, operations
and object can be represented in Alloy. For instance, roles(u) is converted to
u.(URA.ura). Also, roles and permissions are able to converted to Alloy
using “*”, which denotes a reflexive transitive closure operator, and “s”, which
denotes transpose operator to support the role hierarchy. Each term in RCL2000
can be also converted to corresponding Alloy operator. Figure 4.12 gives a detailed
translation algorithm.
The following examples give equivalent Alloy expressions for SSoD-CR and
User-based DSoD constraints.
Translated Alloy Expression for SSoD-CR constraint:
all u:User | all scr:SCR |
#((u.(URA.ura).*(RRA.hierarchy)) &
scr.conflict role) <= scr.cardinality
Translated Alloy Expression for User-based DSoD constraint:
all u:User | all dcr:DCR |
#(u.(US.us).(SR.sr).*(RRA.hierarchy) &
dcr.conflict role) <= dcr.cardinality
RBACFunction Verification The functional specification in the NIST/ANSI stan-
dard for RBAC defines various functions that role-based systems should provide.
These functionalities are described in the standard using a set-based specification
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Figure 4.12: Translation algorithm from RCL2000 to Alloy.
language, Z. Prior to applying these functional definitions for role-based system de-
velopment, the correctness of these definitions needs be checked rigorously. Formal
verification is necessary for this objective.
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In this subsection, I employ DeleteRole function as an example to demon-
strate how the formal verification can assist in finding mistakes in the functional
specifications. In hierarchical RBAC, the following functional properties must be
achieved by the DeleteRole function.
1. The existing role is removed from the Role date set.
2. Any use-to-role assignment relation established by the role is removed.
3. Any permission-to-role assignment relation established by the role is removed.
4. Any role hierarchy relationship established by the role is removed.
The following is the functional definition of DeleteRole for supporting
hierarchical RBAC in the NIST/ANSI RBAC standard.
DeleteRole(role:NAME) C
role 2 ROLES
UA’ = UA n fu:Users  u 7! roleg
assigned users’ = assigned user n frole 7! assigned user(role)g
PA’=PA n fop:OPS,obj:OBJS  (op,obj) 7! roleg
assigned permissions’=assigned permissions n frole 7! assigned permissions(role)g
ROLES’=ROLE n froleg B
An Alloy function is constructed based on the above definition as follows:
fun DeleteRole(r:Role)f
r in Role =>
all p:Permission |
all u:User| (u->r) in URA.ura =>
URA.ura = (URA.ura - (u->r))) &&
(all p:Permission | (p->r) in PRA.pra =>
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PRA.pra = (PRA.pra - (p->r))) &&
(Role = Role - r) g
We can also define an Alloy assertion to describe the RBAC functional prop-
erties Pf discussed earlier. Corresponding functional properties for DeleteRole
operation with the notion of hierarchical RBAC are defined as follows:
assert Check DeleteRole f
all r:Role| all r':Role | all u:User |
all p:Permission |
DeleteRole(r) &&
//The role is removed from the role set
r !in Role &&
//Corresponding UA relations are removed
(u->r) !in URA.ura &&
//Corresponding PA relations are removed
(p->r) !in PRA.pra &&
//Inheritance relations are removed
(r->r') !in RRA.hierarchy &&
(r'->r) !in RRA.hierarchy g
check Check DeleteRole
By running Alloy Analyzer, we can validate this assertion against the RBAC
model specification, which contains the DeleteRole function specification. The
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Alloy Analyzer detects counterexamples, which identify violations of the assertion
with respect to the function specification. After careful inspection, I found that
the functional definition of DeleteRole for hierarchical RBAC in the NIST/ANSI
RBAC standard misses a step for removing inheritance relations established by the
role that is being deleted. In [97], another formal definition of DeleteRole function
for hierarchical RBAC is given. Using the same approach, I identified that the steps
for removing UA relations and PA relations are missed in their specification as well.
RBAC Constraint Verification I now demonstrate how to identify under- and
over-constraints with Alloy using the aforementioned approach in Section 4.2.
Regarding separation of duty principles, the following authorization prop-
erty considering the role hierarchy is unexpected:
• Two conflicting roles are authorized to the same user.
I specify this unexpected authorization property Pa  in Alloy as follows:
pred Check SSoD[ disj r1,r2:Role, u:User, scr:SCR] f
//r1 and r2 are mutually exclusive
r1 in scr.conflict role &&
r2 in scr.conflict role &&
scr.cardinality = 1 &&
//r1 and r2 are authorized to the same user
r1 in u.(URA.ura).*(RRA.hierarchy) &&
r2 in u.(URA.ura).*(RRA.hierarchy) g
run Check SSoD
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Suppose the policy designer only defines a simple SSoD constraint, which
ignores the role hierarchy relation. We can translate the RCL2000 expression for
the simple SSoD constraint to the Alloy expression, and put it into an Alloy fact as
an Alloy constraint as follows:
fact SSoD f
all u:User | all scr:SCR |
#(u.(URA.ura) & scr.conflict role)
<= scr.cardinality g
When running the predicate Check SSoD defined above, instances–in which
conflicting roles are indirectly assigned to a user–are found by Alloy Analyzer. It
means the unexpected authorization property is held by the constraint specification.
In addition, we can conclude the constraint is too week with respect to the autho-
rization property.
Taking into account the following authorization properties for dynamic sep-
aration of duty principle, “a user cannot activate two conflicting roles in the same
session, but can activate them in the different session,” I specify this expected au-
thorization property Pa+ in Alloy as follows:
assert Check DSoD f
all u:User | all disj r1,r2:Role |
all disj s1,s2:Session | all dcr: DCR |
//r1 and r2 are dynamic conflicting roles
r1 in dcr.conflict role &&
r2 in dcr.conflict role &&
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dcr.cardinality = 1 &&
//u creates s1, s2
(u->s1) in US.us &&
(u->s2) in US.us &&
//r1 and r2 cannot be activated in the
//same session, but can be activated
//in the different session
(r1->s1) in SR.sr &&
(r2->s1) !in SR.sr &&
(r2->s2) in SR.sr g
check Check DSoD
Assuming the policy designer defines a User-based DSoD constraint 3 as I
demonstrated before, I define an Alloy fact, which contains this constraint specifi-
cation.
fact DSoD f
all u:User | all dcr:DCR |
#(u.(US.us).(SR.sr) & dcr.conflict role)
<= dcr.cardinality g
Running “check Check DSoD” in Alloy Analyzer, counterexamples are found.
It indicates the expected authorization property expressed in assertion Check DSoD
is denied by the constraint specification. That is, the constraint is too strong, and
3To reduce the complicity, the role hierarchy is omitted in this constraint.
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should be weakened to contain the expected authorization properties. If we replace
the User-based DSoD constraint with the Session-based DSoD constraint, the ex-
pected authorization property defined in assertion Check DSoD is held.
Test Case Generation As mentioned earlier, negative test cases T  are derived
from a formal access control model specification, in which the constraint specifica-
tion is drawn out and serves as an authorization property for the formal verification,
while positive test cases T+ are generated from a formal specification if we take the
constraint specification out of the access control model specification, and consider
the negated constraint specification as an authorization property.
I take the simple SSoD CR constraint as an example to demonstrate the
process of automated test generation. The following assertion is defined to drive
the negative test cases for the constraint specification.
assert SSoD CR f
all u:User | all scr:SCR |
#(u.(URA.ura) & scr.conflict role)
<= scr.cardinality g
check SSoD CR
Checking this assertion against the RBAC model specification, in which
SSoD CR constraint has been taken out, counterexamples are generated. These
counterexamples are used to construct negative test cases as undesired system states
to test the conformance of the SSoD CR constraint in both access control system
design and implementation.
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To derive positive test cases for the simple SSoD CR constraint, the negated
constraint specification is used as an authorization property. I define an assertion
for this objective as follows:
assert Neg SSoD CR f
all u:User | all scr:SCR |
#(u.(URA.ura) & scr.conflict role)
> scr.cardinality g
check Neg SSoD CR
Note that the above assertion states the number of roles–which are from a
conflicting role set–assigned to a user must exceed the cardinality number of the
conflicting role set. Supposing the cardinality number is one, it means a user must
own two or more conflicting roles. Through running this assertion, counterexam-
ples are also generated. Then, positive test cases serving as desired system states
are constructed from these counterexamples.
To generate more meaningful test cases for real application domains, Alloy
signatures need to reflect all RBAC configuration components of the targeted ap-
plication domain for producing specialized instances of the defined Alloy module.
Then, running the constraint assertion with the scope enables Alloy to generate test
cases. Suppose we have a banking system with a user Bob and two conflicting roles,
customerServiceRep and loanOfficer. We first need to define the appropriate
assignment of user, role and conflicting role set as follows.
one sig Bob extends Userfg
one sig customerServiceRep,loanOfficer extends
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Figure 4.13: Structural overview of the RAE.
Rolefg
fact SCR rules f
customerServiceRep in SCR.conflict role &&
loanOfficer in SCR.conflict role g
Alloy definition is then provided to Alloy Analyzer so that it can run SSoD
assertion defined earlier with the scope of one user and two roles. Finally, Al-
loy Analyzer can generate a negative test case for the conformance testing, such
that the user Bob is assigned to two conflicting roles, customerServiceRep and
loanOfficer.
Tool Support.
In this section, I introduce the tools developed to support the realization and analysis
of RBAC model with AMF.
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RBAC Authorization Environment (RAE) To demonstrate the usability of the
approach, a tool called RAE was developed which is based on ArgoUML, an open
source UML-based modeling tool [98]. RAE tool is composed of three major com-
ponents, specification component, analysis component and code generation compo-
nent as shown in Figure 4.13. Specification component is responsible for specifying
RBAC model and constraints. Analysis component is in charge of conflict and vi-
olation checking so as to validate RBAC model and constraints. Code generation
component is used to automatically generate enforcement codes.
Specification component consists of four sub-components: RBAC model
representation, system state presentation, constraint specification and collection
management. Figure 4.14(a) shows the implementation of the RBAC model pre-
sentation and constraint specification components.
• RBACmodel representation employs UML diagrams to represent RBACmodel.
This component is implemented based on ArgoUML.
• System state presentation is responsible to create snapshots of the system
model at particular points using UML object diagrams, which is composed of
a set of objects and a set of association links.
• Constraint specification provides an environment to easily specify authoriza-
tion constraints using RCL2000 and OCL. It is further divided into four
sub-components: constraints template, syntax and type checking, translat-
ing RCL2000 to OCL, and translating RCL2000 to Alloy. To simplify the
constraint definition, some reusable constraint templates for typical RBAC
constraints are provided in the constraint expression editor. Also it has a syn-
tax assistant for user to construct complicated RCL2000 or OCL constraint
expressions conveniently. The syntax checking verifies the constraints ex-
pression against the grammar of the specification language. The type check-
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ing ensures that every RCL2000 or OCL constraints expression can be typed
correctly.
• Conflicting collection management. In the RAE tool, conflicting collections
(SCR/DCR, SCP/DCP and SCU/DCU) are maintained separately from the
constraint expressions.
Validation component is composed of three sub-components: constraint
checking, system state checking and conflicting collection checking.
• Constraint checking tests whether the constraint is violated by the current
system state (snapshot), when a new constraint is established or an old con-
straint is modified. It supports both RCL2000 constraint checking and OCL
constraint checking.
• System state checking is response for identifying the conflicts whenever a
system state is changed. The RAE tool supports four kinds of assignment
relation checking: UA (user-to-role assignment), PA (permission-to-role as-
signment), RH (role-to-role assignment) and role activation. When any as-
signment occurs, all related authorization constraints are evaluated against
the changed system state.
• Conflicting collection checking is in charge of detecting the conflicts resulting
from any changes of conflicting collections. Changing a conflicting collection
affects the semantics of relevant SD constraint expressions.
Code generation component is used to generate java code automatically for
RBAC model and constraints. The enforcement codes are used by developers for
role-based systems.
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(a) RAE: RBAC model and constraint specification.
(b) RASS: simulation of creating session, activating role and check-
ing dynamic constraints.
Figure 4.14: RAE tool and RASS testbed environment
RBAC Authorization Simulation System (RASS) The main purpose of build-
ing an RBAC authorization simulation system is to verify the consistency and cor-
rectness of the generated RBAC enforcement codes. The following goals can be
achieved by the simulation system: (1) executing the RBAC authorization man-
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agement operations to check all administrative functions and review functions; (2)
applying session-related operations to simulate system actions, such as creating a
session and checking dynamic constraints; and (3) using “Check Access” function
to simulate the practical processes of authorization checking.
The RAE tool can generate enforcement codes from the model specified
with the composition of UML and OCL. The model elements and relations defined
with UML are translated to corresponding Java classes and operations. OCL ex-
pressions that define the body of a function or a constraint are translated to the
body of the corresponding Java methods. The generated codes are plain Java codes,
and can be utilized by developers to integrate into a real application system required
RBAC features. I built the RASS system through designing a web-based user inter-
face and a storage layer to incorporate the generated RBAC enforcement modules.
The web-based user interface provides intuitive interactions between the users and
the system functions, which are provided by generated codes, and the storage layer
is in charge of storing the RBAC configurations.
In RASS, RBAC function and constraint implementations are verified by
running extensive test cases. A snapshot of running test cases in RASS system is
shown in Figure 4.14(b). In this snapshot, the simulation of some dynamic system
actions, such as creating and deleting a session, activating and dropping a role, and
checking dynamic constraints, are presented. Consequently, corresponding system
functions, such as CreateSession and DeleteSession, AddActivateRole and
DropActivateRole, and CheckDynamicConstraints, in RBAC model are able
to be evaluated under the simulation system.
Tool Chain The toolset in this work constitutes a toolchain with Alloy Analyzer
depicted in Figure 4.15 to facilitate the application of the proposed methodology for
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Figure 4.15: Toolchain supporting the proposed approach.
automatic analysis, realization and conformance testing of RBAC model and con-
straints. The policy designers are able to specify RBAC constraints with RCL2000,
and then convert RCL2000-based constraints to Alloy expressions in RAE. The
generated Alloy specifications for constraints can be forwarded to Alloy Analyzer.
The formal specifications of an RBAC model are also constructed to Alloy, then
analyzed by Alloy Analyzer as well. In addition, Alloy Analyzer allows to generate
all nonisomorphic instances from an Alloy specification. These instances are then
used as test cases, which are fed into RAE to construct system states. Importantly,
such cases are checked against constraints to validate the RBAC model and con-
straint specifications in the stage of system design as well as utilized by RASS to
evaluate the generated RBAC codes under the simulation. Meanwhile, constraint
anomaly and violation are also analyzed by RAE and RASS.
4.3 Access Control Policy
With the explosive growth of Web applications and Web services deployed on the
Internet, the use of a policy-based approach has received considerable attention to
accommodate the security requirements covering large, open, distributed and het-
erogeneous computing environments. In the era of distributed, heterogeneous and
Web-oriented computing, the increasing complexity of policy-based computing de-
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mands strong support of policy analysis techniques. Without analysis, most benefits
of policy-based techniques and declarative policy languages may be in vain.
In order to ensure the correctness of access control policies for policy-based
computing, I incorporate automated reasoning techniques and systematic anomaly
management mechanisms into the AMF framework as shown in Figure 4.16. For
policy reasoning, I introduce a logic-based reasoning approach for access control
policies. The approach first converts access control policies to a logic-based repre-
sentation. Then, by means of off-the-shelf logic solvers, a variety of analysis ser-
vices can be provided to ensure policy-based system management. The following
are several policy reasoning services that can be accomplished by the logic-based
reasoning approach.
Figure 4.16: Representation and analysis of access control policy.
• Policy Verification. Check if the policy satisfies a particular policy property.
If not, give a counterexample.
• Policy Comparison. For two policies (or policy sets) P1 and P2 check if
whenever P1 yields a decision, P2 will yield the same decision, too. If not,
give a counterexample.
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• Change-Impact Analysis. This analysis consumes two policies that span a set
of changes and summarizes the differences between the two policies. The
analysis can happen even in the absence of formal properties about the sys-
tems.
• Policy Querying. Search for policies in the policy set with respect to particu-
lar attribute values.
Although the logic-based reasoning approach can also support policy anomaly
detection by verifying policies against the given properties [21], it cannot exhaus-
tively identify all potential policy anomalies. Therefore, the AMF framework for
access control policy analysis needs additional modules to systematically man-
age policy anomalies for accurate policy anomaly detection and effective policy
anomaly resolution. Since information visualization technique [99] enables users
to explore, analyze, reason and explain abstract information by taking advantage
of their visual cognition, I further integrate an information visualization technique
in the anomaly management mechanism, which contains two major tasks, conflict
detection and resolution and redundancy discovery and removal.
In this section, I address the policy analysis approach using XACML, which
has become the de facto standard for specifying and enforcing access control poli-
cies for various applications and services, especially, in current Web-based comput-
ing environment.
Representing and Reasoning about Access Control Policy
XACML has been widely adopted to specify access control policies for various
Web applications. With expressive policy languages such as XACML, assuring
the correctness of policy specifications becomes a crucial and yet challenging task
due to the lack of logical and formal foundation. The logic-based policy reason-
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ing approach first turn XACML policies to ASP programs. Compared to a few
existing approaches to formalizing XACML policies, such as [20, 21], the formal
representation in this work is more straightforward and can cover more XACML
features. Furthermore, translating XACML to ASP allows users to leverage off-
the-shelf ASP solvers for a variety of analysis services. I also overview a tool
XACML2ASP and conduct experiments with real-world XACML policies to evaluate
the effectiveness and efficiency of the solution in this work.
Example XACML Policy
Consider an example XACML policy for a software development company, which
is utilized throughout this section, shown in Figure 4.17. The root policy set ps1
contains two policies p1 and p2 which are combined using first applicable com-
bining algorithm. The policy p1, which is the global policy of the entire company,
has two rules r1 and r2 indicating that
• all employees can read and change codes during working hours from 8:00 to
17:00 (r1), and
• nobody can change code during non-working hours (r2).
On the other hand, each department is responsible for deciding whether
employees can read codes during non-working hours. A local policy p2 for a devel-
opment department with three rules r3, r4 and r5 is that
• developers can read codes during non-working hours (r3),
• testers cannot read codes during non-working hours (r4), and
• testers and developers cannot change codes during non-working hours (r5).
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Figure 4.17: An example XACML policy.
Note that the rule combining algorithm for policy p1 is permit overrides
and the rule combining algorithm for policy p2 is deny overrides.
65
Abstracting XACML Policy Components
I consider a subset of XACML that covers more constructs than the ones consid-
ered in [100] and [21]. I allow the most general form of Target, take into account
Condition, and cover all four combining algorithms.
XACML components can be abstracted as follows: Attributes are the names
of elements used by a policy. Attributes are divided into three categories: subject
attributes, resource attributes and action attributes. A Target is a triple hSubjects;
Resources; Actionsi. A Condition is a conjunction of comparisons. An Effect is
either “permit,” “deny,” or “indeterminate.”
• An XACML rule can be abstracted as
hRuleID;Effect;Target;Conditioni
where RuleID is a rule identifier. For example, rule r1 in Figure 4.17 can be
viewed as
hr1;permit;hemployee;read_change;codesi;8 time 17i:
• An XACML policy can be abstracted as
hPolicyID;Target;Combining Algorithm;hr1; : : : ;rnii
where PolicyID is a policy identifier, r1; : : : ;rn are rule identifiers and Com-
bining Algorithm is either permit overrides, deny overrides, or
first applicable. For example, policy p1 in Figure 4.17 is abstracted as:
hp1;Null;permit overrides;hr1;r2ii:
• Similarly an XACML policy set can be abstracted as
hPolicySetID;Target;Combining Algorithm;hp1; : : : ; pm; psm+1; : : : ; psnii
66
where PolicySetID is a policy set identifier, p1; : : : ; pm are policy identifiers,
psm+1; : : : ; psn are policy set identifiers, and Combining Algorithm is either
permit overrides, deny overrides, first applicable, or
only one applicable. For example, policy set ps1 can be viewed as
hps1;Null;first applicable;hp1;p2ii:
Turning XACML into ASP. I provide a translation module that turns an
XACML description into a program in answer set programming (ASP) [26, 27].
This interprets a formal semantics of XACML language in terms of the Answer Set
semantics.
The translation module converts an XACML rule
hRuleID;Effect;Target;Conditioni
into a set of ASP rules 4
decision(RuleID;Effect) Target^Condition:
An XACML policy
hPolicyID;Target;Combining Algorithm;hr1; : : : ;rnii
can be also translated into a set of ASP rules. In the following we assume that
R and R0 are variables that range over all rule ids, and V is a variable that ranges
over fpermit;deny;indeterminateg. In order to represent the effect of each rule ri
(1 i n) on policy, I write
decision from(PolicyID;ri;V ) decision(ri;V ):
Each rule combining algorithms is turned into logic programming rules un-
der the stable model semantics as follows:
4I identify Target with the conjunction of its components. Also, I identify “^ ” with “,”, “ ”
with “ :- ” and a rule of the form A B;C_D as a set of the two rules A B;C: and A B;D.
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• permit overrides of policy p is represented as
decision(p;permit) decision f rom(p;R;permit)^Target:
decision(p;deny) decision f rom(p;R;deny)^ not decision(p;permit)
^Target:
• deny overrides of policy p is represented as
decision(p;deny) decision f rom(p;R;deny)^Target:
decision(p;permit) decision f rom(p;R;permit)^ not decision(p;deny)
^Target:
• first applicable of policy p is represented as
has decision f rom(p;R) decision f rom(p;R;V ):
decision(p;V ) decision f rom(p;ri;V )^
^
1ki 1
not
has decision f rom(p;rk)^Target:
The translation of a policy set is similar to the translation of a policy ex-
cept that the policy combining algorithm only one applicable needs to be taken
into account. For instance, only one applicable of policy set ps is represented as
follows:
decision(ps;V ) decision f rom(ps;P;V )^1fhas decision f rom(ps;P) : policy(P)g1:
decision(ps;indeterminate) 2fhas decision f rom(ps;P) : policy(P)g:
Figure 4.18 shows an ASP representation of the example XACML policy in
the language of Gringo by applying the translation approach.
XACML Policy Analysis using ASP
Once we represent an XACML into an ASP program P, we can use off-the-shelf
ASP solvers for several automated analysis services. In this section, I mainly illus-
trate how policy verification can be handled by the policy analysis approach.
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__________________________________________________________
value(permit;deny;indeterminate).
rule(r1;r2;r3;r4;r5).
policy(p1;p2).
policyset(ps1).
time(0..23).
#domain value(V;V1).
#domain rule(R;R1).
#domain policy(P).
#domain time(T).
% domain definition
subject(employee) :- subject(developer).
subject(employee) :- subject(tester).
% r1
decision(r1,permit) :- subject(employee),action(read),
resource(codes),8<=T,T<=17, current_time(T).
decision(r1,permit) :- subject(employee),action(change),
resource(codes),8<=T,T<=17, current_time(T).
% r2
decision(r2,deny) :- subject(employee),action(change),
resource(codes).
% r3
decision(r3,permit) :- subject(developer),action(read),
resource(codes).
% r4
decision(r4,deny) :- subject(tester),action(read),
resource(codes).
% r5
decision(r5,deny) :- subject(tester),action(change),
resource(codes).
decision(r5,deny) :- subject(developer),action(change),
resource(codes).
% p1
decision_from(p1,r1,V) :- decision(r1,V).
decision_from(p1,r2,V) :- decision(r2,V).
decision(p1,permit) :- decision_from(p1,R,permit).
decision(p1,deny) :- decision_from(p1,R,deny),
not decision(p1,permit).
% p2
decision_from(p2,r3,V) :- decision(r3,V).
decision_from(p2,r4,V) :- decision(r4,V).
decision_from(p2,r5,V) :- decision(r5,V).
decision(p2,deny) :- decision_from(p2,R,deny).
decision(p2,permit) :- decision_from(p2,R,permit),
not decision(p2,deny).
% ps1
decision_from(ps1,p1,V) :- decision(p1,V).
decision_from(ps1,p2,V) :- decision(p2,V).
has_decision_from(ps1,p1) :- decision_from(ps1,p1,V).
decision(ps1,V) :- decision_from(ps1,p1,V).
decision(ps1,V) :- decision_from(ps1,p2,V),
not has_decision_from(ps1,p1).
__________________________________________________________
Figure 4.18: ASP representation of the example XACML policy.
69
The problem of verifying a security property F against an XACML descrip-
tion can be cast into the problem of checking whether the program
P[Pquery[Pconfig
has no answer sets, whereP is the program corresponding to the XACML specifica-
tion, Pquery is the program corresponding to the program that encodes the negation
of the property to check, and Pconfig is the following program that generates arbi-
trary configurations.
subject_attributes(developer;tester;employee).
action_attributes(read;change).
resource_attributes(codes).
1{subject(X) : subject_attributes(X)}.
1{action(X) : action_attributes(X)}.
1{resource(X) : resource_attributes(X)}.
1{current_time(X) : time(X)}1.
If no answer set is found, this implies that the property is verified. Oth-
erwise, an answer set returned by an ASP solver serves as a counterexample that
indicates why the description does not entail F . This helps the policy designer find
out the design flaws in the policy specification.
For example, consider the example XACML policy shown in Figure 4.17.
We need to ensure that a developer cannot change codes during non-working hours.
The input query Pquery can be represented as follows:
working_hours :- 8<=T, T<=17,current_time(T).
check :- decision(ps1,permit),
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subject(developer),action(change),
resource(codes),not working_hours.
:- not check.
Given the corresponding ASP program of ps1, the negation of the property,
and Pconfig, Gringo and ClaspD return no answer set from which we conclude that
the property is held.
As another example, consider the query if a developer is always allowed to
read codes during non-working hours. This query Pquery can be represented as
working_hours :- 8<=T, T<=17,current_time(T).
check :- decision(ps1,deny),
subject(developer), action(read),
resource(codes),not working_hours.
:- not check.
A policy designer may intend that this property would follow based on the
policy specification. However, the following answer set is found, which indicates a
design flaw of the policy.
{subject(developer) action(read)
action(change) resource(codes)
decision(ps1,deny) decision(p1,deny)
decision(p2,deny) decision(r2,deny)
decision(r3,permit) decision(r5,deny)}
That is, a developer’s request to read the codes is denied if his request also
includes changing the codes5. From this answer set, the policy designer finds that
5XACML supports multi-valued requests, which contains multiple id-value pairs in the subject,
resource, or action attribute.
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p2, which is supposed to return permit, returns deny. It is because r5 returns deny,
and the combining algorithm of p2 is deny overrides.
In fact, the reason that ps1 returns deny is because p1 returns deny. Rule
r1 is not applicable since its condition is not satisfied and rule r2 returns deny.
Then, the policy designer realizes the flaw and could disallow the concurrency of
two actions within a request. However, even after adding such a constraint, another
answer set is found as follows:
{subject(developer) subject(tester)
action(read) resource(codes)
decision(ps1,deny) decision(p2,deny)
decision(r3,permit) decision(r4,deny)}
That is, when someone is both developer and tester, he cannot read codes
during non-working hours since rule r4 disallows it. In this answer set, ps1 returns
deny because p1 is not applicable and p2 returns deny. In turn, it is because r4
returns deny. If we add a constraint disallowing a person to be both developer and
tester roles simultaneously, the program returns no answer set as intended.
Implementation and Evaluation
A tool called XACML2ASP have been implemented in Java 1.6.3. XACML2ASP can
automatically convert core XACML and RBAC constraint expressions into ASP.
The generated ASP-based policy representations are then fed into an ASP reasoner
to carry out analysis services. I evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of the
proposes approach on several real-world XACML policies. Gringo was employed
as the ASP solver for the evaluation. The experiments were performed on Intel Core
2 Duo CPU 3.00 GHz with 3.25 GB RAM running on Windows XP SP2.
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In the evaluation, I utilized ten real-world XACML policies collected from
three different sources. Six of the policies, CodeA,CodeB,CodeC,CodeD,Continue-
a and Continue-b are XACML policies used by [20]; among them,
Continue-a and Continue-b are designed for a real-world Web application support-
ing a conference management. Three of the policiesWeirdx, FreeCS andGradeSheet
are utilized by [101]. The Pluto policy is employed in ARCHON system,6 which
is a digital library that federates the collections of physics with multiple degrees of
meta data richness.
Table 4.2: Experimental results on real-life XACML policies.
Policy # of Rules Converting Time(s) Reasoning Time(s)
CodeA 2 0.000 0.000
CodeB 3 0.000 0.000
CodeC 4 0.000 0.002
CodeD 5 0.000 0.004
Weirdx 6 0.005 0.006
FreeCS 7 0.005 0.006
GradeSheet 14 0.015 0.012
Pluto 21 0.016 0.031
Continue-a 298 0.120 0.405
Continue-b 306 0.125 0.427
Table 4.2 shows the number of rules contained in each policy, the conversion
time from XACML to ASP, and the reasoning time using Gringo + claspd for each
policy. Note that the reasoning time was measured by enabling Gringo + claspd
to generate answer sets representing all permitted requests for each policy. From
Table 4.2, we observe that the conversion time from XACML to ASP in XACML2ASP
is fast enough to handle larger size of policies, such as Continue-a and Continue-b.
It also indicates that the reasoning process for policy analysis in ASP solver is also
efficient enough for a variety of policy analysis services.
6http://archon.cs.odu.edu/.
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Anomaly Detection and Resolution for Access Control Policy
In an XACML policy, multiple rules may overlap, which means one access re-
quest may match several rules. Moreover, multiple rules within one policy may
conflict, implying that those rules not only overlap each other but also yield dif-
ferent decisions. Conflicts in an XACML policy may lead to both safety problem
(e.g. allowing unauthorized access) and availability problem (e.g. denying legiti-
mate access). An intuitive means for resolving policy conflicts by a policy designer
is to remove all conflicts by modifying the policies. However, resolving conflicts
through changing the policies is remarkably difficult, even impossible, in practice
from many aspects. First, the number of conflicts in an XACML policy is poten-
tially large, since an XACML policy may consist of hundreds or thousands of rules.
Second, conflicts in XACML policies are probably very complicated, because one
rule may conflict with multiple other rules, and one conflict may be associated with
several rules. Besides, an XACML policy for a distributed application may be ag-
gregated from multiple parties. Also, an XACML policy may be maintained by
more than one administrator. Without a priori knowledge on the original intentions
of policy specification, changing a policy may affect the policy’s semantics and may
not resolve conflicts correctly. Furthermore, in some cases, a policy designer may
intentionally introduce certain overlaps in XACML policy components by implic-
itly reflecting that only the first rule is important. In this case, conflicts are not an
error, but intended, which would not be necessary to be changed.
Since the conflicts in XACML policies always exist and are hard to be elim-
inated, XACML defines four different combining algorithms to automatically re-
solve conflicts [6]: Deny-Overrides, Permit-Overrides, First-Applicable and Only-
One-Applicable. Unfortunately, XACML currently lacks a systematic mechanism
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for precisely detecting conflicts. Identifying conflicts in XACML policies is crit-
ical for policy designers since the correctness of selecting a combining algorithm
for an XACML policy or policy set component heavily relies on the information
from conflict diagnosis. Without precise conflict information, the effectiveness of
combining algorithms for resolving policy conflicts cannot be guaranteed.
Another critical problem for XACML policy analysis is redundancy discov-
ery and removal. A rule in an XACML policy is redundant if every access request
that matches the rule also matches other rules with the same effect. As the response
time of an access request largely depends on the number of rules to be parsed within
a policy, redundancies in a policy may adversely affect the performance of policy
evaluation. Therefore, policy redundancy is treated as policy anomaly as well. With
the significant growth of Web applications deployed on the Internet, XACML poli-
cies grow rapidly in size and complexity. Hence, redundancy elimination can be
treated as one of effective solutions for optimizing XACML policies and improving
the performance of XACML evaluation.
Recently, policy anomaly detection has received a great deal of attention [22,
102, 103, 23], especially, in firewall policy analysis. Corresponding policy analysis
tools, such as Firewall Policy Advisor [22] and FIREMAN [23], with the goal of
discovering firewall policy anomalies have been developed. However, we cannot
directly adopt those prior analysis approaches for XACML due to several reasons.
First, most prior approaches mainly have the capability to detect pairwise policy
anomalies, while a complete anomaly detection should consider all policy com-
ponents as a whole piece. In other words, prior policy analysis approaches are
still needed to be improved [104]. Second, the structure of firewall policies is flat
but XACML has a hierarchical structure supporting recursive policy specification.
Third, a firewall policy only supports one conflict resolution strategy (first-match)
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to resolve conflicts but XACML has four rule/policy combining algorithms. Last
but not the least, a firewall rule is typically specified with fixed fields, while an
XACML rule can be multi-valued. Therefore, a new policy analysis mechanism is
desirable to cater those requirements from anomaly analysis in XACML policies.
In this part, I introduce a policy-based segmentation technique, which adopts
a binary decision diagram (BDD)-based data structure to perform set operations,
for policy anomaly discovery and resolution. Based on this technique, an autho-
rization space defined by an XACML policy or policy set component can be di-
vided into a set of disjoint segments. Each segment associated with a unique set of
XACML components indicates an overlap relation (either conflicting or redundant)
among those components. Accurate anomaly information is crucial to the success
of anomaly resolution. For example, conflict diagnosis information provided by a
policy analysis tool can be utilized to guide the policy designers in selecting ap-
propriate combining algorithms. Moreover, I observe that current XACML conflict
resolution mechanisms are too restrictive by applying only one combining algo-
rithm to resolve all identified conflicts within an XACML policy or policy set com-
ponent. Also, many other desirable conflict resolution strategies exist [55, 54, 56],
but cannot be directly supported by XACML. Thus, I additionally present a flexible
and extensible policy conflict resolution mechanism in this dissertation. Besides,
I discuss the implementation of a policy analysis tool XAnalyzer, which is based
on the proposed approach. To evaluate the practicality of the tool, the experiments
deal with both real-life and synthetic XACML policies.
Anomalies in XACML Policies
An XACML policy may contain both policy components and policy set compo-
nents. Often, a rule anomaly occurs in a policy component, which consists of a
sequence of rules. On the other hand, a policy set component consists of a set of
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Figure 4.19: Anomalies in an example XACML policy.
policies or other policy sets, thus anomalies may also arise among policies or policy
sets. Thus, I address XACML policy anomalies at both policy level and policy set
level.
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• Anomalies at Policy Level: A rule is conflicting with other rules, if this rule
overlaps with others but defines a different effect. For example, the deny rule
r1 is in conflict with the permit rule r2 in Figure 4.19 because rule r2 allows
the access requests from a designer to change codes in the time interval [8:00,
17:00], which are supposed to be denied by r1; and a rule is redundant if there
is other same or more general rules available that have the same effect. For
instance, if we change the effect of r2 to Deny, r3 becomes redundant since
r2 will also deny a designer to change reports or codes in the time interval
[12:00, 13:00].
• Anomalies at Policy Set Level: Anomalies may also occur across policies or
policy sets in an XACML policy. For example, considering two policy com-
ponents P1 and P2 of the policy set PS1 in Figure 4.19, P1 is conflicting with
P2, because P1 permits the access requests that a developer changes reports in
the time interval [8:00, 17:00], but which are denied by P2. On the other hand,
P1 denies the requests allowing a designer to change reports or codes in the
time interval [12:00, 13:00], which are permitted by P2. Supposing the effect
of r2 is changed to Deny and the condition of r2 is removed, r4 is turned to
be redundant with respect to r2, even though r2 and r4 are placed in different
policies P1 and P2, respectively.
A policy anomaly may involve in multiple rules. For example, in Fig-
ure 4.19, access requests that a designer changes codes in the time interval [12:00,
13:00] are permitted by r2, but denied by both r1 and r3. Thus, this conflict asso-
ciates with three rules. For another example, suppose the effect of r3 is changed
to Permit and the subject of r3 is replaced by Manager and Developer. If we only
examine pairwise redundancies, r3 is not a redundant rule. However, if we check
multiple rules simultaneously, we can identify r3 is redundant considering r2 and r5
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together. I observe that precise anomaly diagnosis information is crucial for achiev-
ing an effective anomaly resolution. In this work, I attempt to design a systematic
approach and corresponding tool not only for accurate anomaly detection but also
for effective anomaly resolution.
Underlying Data Structure
The proposed policy-based segmentation technique introduced in subsequent sec-
tions requires a well-formed representation of policies for performing a variety of
set operations. Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) [105] is a data structure that has
been widely used for formal verification and simplification of digital circuits. In
this work, I leverage BDD as the underlying data structure to represent XACML
policies and facilitate effective policy analysis.
Given an XACML policy, it can be parsed to identify subject, action, re-
source and condition attributes. Once these attributes are identified, all XACML
rules can be transformed into Boolean expressions [106]. Each Boolean expression
of a rule is composed of atomic Boolean expressions combined by logical opera-
tors _ and ^. Atomic Boolean expressions are treated as equality constraints or
range constraints on attributes (e.g. Sub ject = “student”) or on conditions (e.g.
8 : 00 Time 17 : 00).
Example 1 Consider the example XACML policy in Figure 4.19 in terms of atomic
Boolean expressions. The Boolean expression for rule r1 is:
(Sub ject = “Designer”_Sub ject = “Tester”)^(Resource= “Codes”)^(Action=
“Change”)
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The Boolean expression for rule r2 is:
(Sub ject = “Designer”_Sub ject = “Developer”)^(Resource= “Reports”_
Resource = “Codes”)^ (Action = “Read”_Action = “Change”)^ (8 : 00 
Time 17 : 00)
Boolean expressions for XACML rules may consist of atomic Boolean ex-
pressions with overlapping value ranges. In such cases, those atomic Boolean ex-
pressions are needed to be transformed into a sequence of new atomic Boolean ex-
pressions with disjoint value ranges. Agrawal et al. [107] have identified different
categories of such atomic Boolean expressions and addressed corresponding solu-
tions for those issues. I adopt similar approach to construct the Boolean expressions
for XACML rules.
Table 4.3: Atomic Boolean expressions and corresponding Boolean variables for
P1.
Unique Atomic Boolean Expression Boolean Variable
Sub ject = “Designer” S1
Sub ject = “Tester” S2
Sub ject = “Developer” S3
Sub ject = “Manager” S4
Resource= “Reports” R1
Resource= “Codes” R2
Action= “Read” A1
Action= “Change” A2
8 : 00 Time< 12 : 00 C1
12 : 00 Time< 13 : 00 C2
13 : 00 Time 17 : 00 C3
Each of the atomic Boolean expression is encoded as a Boolean variable.
For example, an atomic Boolean expression Subject=“Designer” is encoded into a
Boolean variable S1. A complete list of Boolean encoding for the example XACML
policy in Figure 4.19 is shown in Table 4.3. I then utilize the Boolean encoding to
construct Boolean expressions in terms of Boolean variables for XACML rules.
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Example 2 Consider the example XACML policy in Figure 4.19 in terms of Boolean
variables. The Boolean expression for rule r1 is:
(S1_S2)^ (R2)^ (A2)
The Boolean expression for rule r2 is:
(S1_S3)^ (R1_R2)^ (A1_A2)^ (C1_C2_C3)
Figure 4.20: Representing and operating on rules of XACML policy with BDD.
BDDs are acyclic directed graphs which represent Boolean expressions com-
pactly. Each nonterminal node in a BDD represents a Boolean variable, and has two
edges with binary labels, 0 and 1 for nonexistent and existent, respectively. Termi-
nal nodes represent Boolean value T (True) or F (False). Figures 4.20(a) and 4.20(b)
give BDD representations of two rules r1 and r2, respectively.
Once the BDDs are constructed for XACML rules, performing set opera-
tions, such as unions ([), intersections (\) and set differences (n), required by the
policy-based segmentation algorithms (see Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2) is effi-
cient as well as straightforward. Figure 4.20(c) shows an integrated BDD, which
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is the difference of r2’ BDD from r1’ BDD (r2 n r1). Note that the resulting BDDs
from the set operations may have less number of nodes due to the canonical repre-
sentation of BDD.
Conflict Detection and Resolution
I first introduce a concept of authorization space, which adopts aforementioned
BDD-based policy representation to perform policy anomaly analysis. This concept
is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Authorization Space). Let Rx, Px and PSx be the set of rules, policies
and policy sets, respectively, of an XACML policy x. An authorization space for an
XACML policy component c 2 Rx [Px [PSx represents a collection of all access
requests Qc to which a policy component c is applicable.
Conflict Detection Approach The proposed conflict detection mechanism exam-
ines conflicts at both policy level and policy set level for XACML policies. In order
to precisely identify policy conflicts and facilitate an effective conflict resolution, I
introduce a policy-based segmentation technique to partition the entire authoriza-
tion space of a policy into disjoint authorization space segments. Then, conflicting
authorization space segments (called conflicting segment in the rest of this disserta-
tion), which contain policy components with different effects, are identified. Each
conflicting segment indicates a policy conflict.
Conflict Detection at Policy Level. A policy component in an XACML
policy includes a set of rules. Each rule defines an authorization space with the
effect of either permit or deny. An authorization space with the effect of permit
is called as permitted space and an authorization space with the effect of deny is
called as denied space in this dissertation.
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Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of generating conflicting segments for
a policy component P. An entire authorization space derived from a policy com-
ponent is first partitioned into a set of disjoint segments. As shown in lines 17-33
in Algorithm 1, a function called Partition() accomplishes this procedure. This
function works by adding an authorization space s derived from a rule r to an autho-
rization space set S. A pair of authorization spaces must satisfy one of the follow-
ing relations: subset (line 19), superset (line 24), partial match (line 27), or disjoint
(line 32). Therefore, one can utilize set operations to separate the overlapped spaces
into disjoint spaces.
Conflicting segments are identified as shown in lines 6-10 in Algorithm 1.
A set of conflicting segmentsCS : fcs1, cs2, . . . , csng from conflicting rules has the
following three properties:
1. All conflicting segments are pairwise disjoint:
csi\ cs j = /0;1 i 6= j  n;
2. Any two different requests q and q
0
within a single conflicting segment (csi)
are matched by exact same set of rules:
GetRule(q) = GetRule(q
0
); 78q 2 csi;q0 2 csi;q 6= q0 ; and
3. The effects of matched rules in any conflicting segments contain both “Permit”
and “Deny.”
To facilitate the correct interpretation of analysis results, a concise and in-
tuitive representation method is necessary. For the purposes of brevity and under-
standability, I first employ a two dimensional geometric representation for each
authorization space segment. Note that a rule in an XACML policy typically has
7GetRule() is a function that returns all rules matching a request.
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Algorithm 1: Identify Disjoint Conflicting Authorization Spaces of Policy P
Input: A policy P with a set of rules.
Output: A set of disjoint conflicting authorization spaces CS for P.
1 /* Partition the entire authorization space of P into disjoint spaces*/
2 S:New();
3 S   Partition P(P);
4 /* Identify the conflicting segments */
5 CS:New();
6 foreach s 2 S do
7 /* Get all rules associated with a segment s */
8 R
0    GetRule(s);
9 if 9ri 2 R0 ;r j 2 R0 , ri 6= r j and ri:E f f ect 6= r j:E f f ect then
10 CS:Append(s);
11 Partition P(P)
12 R   GetRule(P);
13 foreach r 2 R do
14 sr    AuthorizationSpace(r);
15 S   Partition(S;sr);
16 return S;
17 Partition(S;sr)
18 foreach s 2 S do
19 /* sr is a subset of s*/
20 if sr  s then
21 S:Append(sn sr);
22 s   sr;
23 Break;
24 /* sr is a superset of s*/
25 else if sr  s then
26 sr    sr n s;
27 /* sr partially matches s*/
28 else if sr \ s 6= /0 then
29 S:Append(sn sr);
30 s   sr \ s;
31 sr    sr n s;
32 S:Append(sr);
33 return S;
multiple fields, thus a complete representation of authorization space should be
multi-dimensional. Also, I utilize colored rectangles to denote two kinds of au-
thorization spaces: permitted space (white color) and denied space (grey color),
respectively. Figure 4.21(a) gives a representation of the segments of authoriza-
tion space derived from the policy P1 in the XACML example policy shown in
Figure 4.19. We can notice that five unique disjoint segments are generated. In par-
ticular, three conflicting segments cs1, cs2 and cs3 are identified, representing three
policy conflicts.
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(a) Disjoint segments of authorization
space for policy P1.
(b) Grid representation of policy conflict in policy
P1.
Figure 4.21: Authorization space representation for policy P1 in the example
XACML policy.
When a set of XACML rules interacts, one overlapping relation may be as-
sociated with several rules. Meanwhile, one rule may overlap with multiple other
rules and can be involved in a couple of overlapping relations (overlapping seg-
ments). Different kinds of segments and associated rules can be viewed like Fig-
ure 4.21(a). However, it is still difficult for a policy designer or administrator to
figure out how many segments one rule is involved in. To address the need of a
more precise conflict representation, I additionally introduce a grid representation
that is a matrix-based visualization of policy conflicts, in which space segments are
displayed along the horizontal axis of the matrix, rules are shown along the vertical
axis, and the intersection of a segment and a rule is a grid that displays a rule’s
subspace covered by the segment.
Figure 4.21(b) shows a grid representation of conflicts in the policy P1 in the
example policy. We can easily determine which rules are covered by a segment, and
which segments are associated with a rule. For example, as shown in Figure 4.21(b),
we can notice that a conflicting segment cs2, which points out a conflict, is related
to a rule set consisting of three rules r1, r2 and r3 (highlighted with a horizontal
red rectangle), and a rule r2 is involved in three conflicting segments cs1, cs2 and
cs3 (highlighted with a vertical red rectangle). The grid representation provides a
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better understanding of policy conflicts to policy designers and administrators with
an overall view of related segments and rules.
Conflict Detection at Policy Set Level. There are two major challenges
that need to be taken into consideration when we design an approach for XACML
analysis at policy set level.
1. XACML supports four rule/policy combining algorithms: First-Applicable,
Only-One-Applicable, Deny-Overrides, and Permit-Overrides.
2. An XACML policy is specified recursively and therefore has a hierarchical
structure. In XACML, a policy set contains a sequence of policies or policy
sets, which may further contain other policies or policy sets.
Each authorization space segment also has an effect, which is determined by
the XACML components covered by this segment. For nonconflicting segments,
the effect of a segment equals to the effect of components covered by this segment.
Regarding conflicting segments, the effect of a segment depends on the following
four cases of combining algorithm (CA ), which is used by the owner (a policy or
a policy set) of the segment.
1. CA =First-Applicable: In this case, the effect of a conflicting segment equals
to the effect of the first component covered by the conflicting segment.
2. CA =Permit-Overrides: The effect of a conflicting segment is always as-
signed with “Permit,” since there is at least one component with “Permit”
effect within this conflicting segment.
3. CA =Deny-Overrides: The effect of a conflicting segment always equals to
“Deny.”
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4. CA =Only-One-Applicable: The effect of a conflicting segment equals to the
effect of only-applicable component.
To support the recursive specifications of XACML policies, an XACML
policy can be parsed and modeled as a tree structure, where each terminal node rep-
resents an individual rule, each nonterminal node whose children are all terminal
nodes represents a policy, and each nonterminal node whose children are all non-
terminal nodes represents a policy set. At each nonterminal node, the target and
combining algorithm are stored. At each terminal node, the target and effect of the
corresponding rule are stored.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode of identifying disjoint conflicting autho-
rization spaces for a policy set PS based on the tree structure. In order to partition
authorization spaces of all nodes contained in a policy set tree, this algorithm recur-
sively calls the partition functions, Partition P() and Partition PS(), to deal
with the policy nodes (lines 16-17) and the policy set nodes (lines 19-20), respec-
tively. Once all children nodes of a policy set are partitioned, we can then represent
the authorization space of each child node (E) with two subspaces permitted sub-
space (EP) and denied subspace (ED) by aggregating all “Permit” segments and
“Deny” segments, respectively, as follows:8><>: E
P =
S
si2SE si if E f f ect(si) = Permit
ED =
S
si2SE si if E f f ect(si) = Deny
(4.1)
where SE denotes the set of authorization space segments of the child node E.
For example, since the combining algorithm (CA ) of the policy P1 in the
example XACML policy is Deny-Overrides, the effects of three conflicting seg-
ments shown in Figure 4.21 are “Deny”. Figure 4.22 shows the result of aggre-
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Algorithm 2: Identify Disjoint Conflicting Authorization Spaces of Policy Set PS
Input: A policy set PS with a set of policies or other policy sets.
Output: A set of disjoint conflicting authorization spaces CS for PS.
1 /* Partition the entire authorization space of PS into disjoint spaces*/
2 S:New();
3 S   Partition PS(PS);
4 /* Identify the conflicting segments */
5 CS:New();
6 foreach s 2 S do
7 E    GetElement(s);
8 if 9ei 2 E;e j 2 E, ei 6= e j and ei:E f f ect 6= e j:E f f ect then
9 CS:Append(s);
10 Partition PS(PS)
11 S
00
:New();
12 C   GetChild(PS);
13 foreach c 2C do
14 S
0
:New();
15 /* c is a policy*/
16 if IsPolicy(c) = true then
17 S
0    Partition P(c);
18 /* c is a policy set*/
19 else if IsPolicySet(c) = true then
20 S
0    Partition PS(c)
21 EP:New();
22 ED:New();
23 foreach s0 2 S0 do
24 if Effect(s0) = Permit then
25 EP    EP[ s0 ;
26 else if Effect(s0) = Deny then
27 ED    ED[ s0 ;
28 S
00    Partition(S00 ;EP);
29 S
00    Partition(S00 ;ED);
30 return S00 ;
 
Figure 4.22: Aggregation of authorization spaces for policy P1 in the example
XACML policy.
gating authorization spaces of the policy P1, where two subspaces PP1 and P
D
1 are
constructed.
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(a) Disjoint segments of authorization space for policy
set PS1.
(b) Grid representation of policy conflicts
in policy set PS1.
Figure 4.23: Authorization space representation for policy set PS1 in the example
XACML policy.
In order to generate segments for the policy set PS, we can then leverage
two subspaces (EP and ED) of each child node (E) to partition existing authorization
space set belonging to PS (lines 28-29). Figure 4.23(a) represents an example of the
segments of authorization space derived from policy set PS1 in the example policy
(Figure 4.19). We can observe that seven unique disjoint segments are generated,
and two of them cs1 and cs2 are conflicting segments. I additionally give a grid
representation of conflicts in the policy set PS1 shown in Figure 4.23(b). Then, we
can easily identify that the conflicting segment cs1 is related to two subspaces: P1’s
permitted subspace PP1 and P2’s denied subspace P
D
2 , and the policy P1 is associated
with two conflicts, where P1’s permitted subspace PP1 is involved in the conflict
represented by cs1 and P1’s denied subspace PD1 is related to the conflict represented
by cs2.
Fine-Grained Conflict Resolution Once conflicts within a policy component or
policy set component are identified, a policy designer can choose appropriate con-
flict resolution strategies to resolve those identified conflicts. However, current
XACML conflict resolution mechanisms have limitations in resolving conflicts ef-
fectively. First, existing conflict resolution mechanisms in XACML are too restric-
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Figure 4.24: Fine-grained conflict resolution framework.
tive and only allow a policy designer to select one combining algorithm to resolve
all identified conflicts within a policy or policy set component. A policy designer
may want to adopt different combining algorithms to resolve different conflicts.
Second, XACML offers four conflict resolution strategies. However, many conflict
resolution strategies exist [54, 55, 56], but cannot be specified in XACML. Thus,
it is necessary to seek a comprehensive conflict resolution mechanism for more ef-
fective conflict resolution. Towards this end, I introduce a flexible and extensible
conflict resolution framework to achieve a fine-grained conflict resolution as shown
in Figure 4.24.
Effect Constraint Generation from Conflict Resolution Strategy. The
conflict resolution framework introduces an effect constraint that is assigned to
each conflicting segment. An effect constraint for a conflicting segment defines
a desired response (either permit or deny) that an XACML policy should take
90
when any access request matches the conflicting segment. The effect constraint is
derived from the conflict resolution strategy applied to the conflicting segment. A
policy designer chooses an appropriate conflict resolution strategy for each identi-
fied conflict by examining the features of conflicting segment and associated con-
flicting components. In the conflict resolution framework, a policy designer is able
to adopt different strategies to resolve conflicts indicated by different conflicting
segments. In addition to four standard XACML conflict resolution strategies, user-
defined strategies [56], such as Recency-Overrides, Specificity-Overrides andHigh-
Majority-Overrides, can be implied in the framework as well. For example, apply-
ing a conflict resolution strategy, High-Majority-Overrides, to the second conflict-
ing segment cs2 of policy P1 depicted in Figure 4.21, an effect constraint Effect =
“Deny” will be generated for cs2.
Conflict Resolution Based on Effect Constraints. A key feature of adopt-
ing effect constraints in the framework is that other conflict resolution strategies
assigned to resolve different conflicts by a policy designer can be automatically
mapped to standard XACML combining algorithms, without changing the way
that current XACML implementations perform. As illustrated in Figure 4.24, an
XACML combining algorithm can be derived for a target component by examin-
ing all effect constraints of the conflicting segments. If all effect constraints are
“Permit,” Permit-Overrides is selected for the target component to resolve all con-
flicts. In case that all effect constraints are “Deny,” Deny-Overrides is assigned to
the target component. Then, if the target component is a policy set and all effect
constraints can be satisfied by applyingOnly-One-Applicable combining algorithm,
Only-One-Applicable is selected as the combining algorithm of the target compo-
nent. Otherwise, First-Applicable is selected as the combining algorithm of the
target component. In order to resolve all conflicts within the target component by
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applying First-Applicable, the process of reordering conflicting components is com-
pulsory. Therefore, the first-applicable component in each conflicting segment has
the same effect with corresponding effect constraint.
Redundancy Discovery and Removal
The proposed redundancy discovery and removal mechanism also leverage the policy-
based segmentation technique to explore redundancies at both policy level and pol-
icy set level. I give a definition of rule redundancy as follows, which serves as a
foundation of the redundancy elimination approach.
Definition 5 (Rule Redundancy). A rule r is redundant in an XACML policy p
iff the authorization space derived from the resulting policy p0 after removing r is
equivalent to the authorization space defined by p.
Redundancy Elimination at Policy Level I employ following four steps to iden-
tify and eliminate rule redundancies at policy level: authorization space segmenta-
tion, property assignment for rule subspaces, rule correlation break, and redundant
rule removal.
Authorization Space Segmentation. I first perform the policy segmenta-
tion function Partition P() defined in Algorithm 1 to divide the entire autho-
rization space of a policy into disjoint segments. I classify the policy segments in
following categories: non-overlapping segment and overlapping segment, which is
further divided into conflicting overlapping segment and non-conflicting overlap-
ping segment. Each non-overlapping segment associates with one unique rule and
each overlapping segment is related to a set of rules, which may conflict with each
other (conflicting overlapping segment) or have the same effect (non-conflicting
overlapping segment). Figure 4.25(a) illustrates an authorization space segmenta-
tion for a policy with eight rules. In this example, two policy segments s4 and s6
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are non-overlapping segments. Other policy segments are overlapping segments,
including two conflicting overlapping segments s1 and s3, and two non-conflicting
overlapping segments s2 and s5.
(a) Authorization space segmentation. (b) Property assignment.
(c) Redundancy removal.
Figure 4.25: Example of eliminating redundancies at policy level.
Property Assignment for Rule Subspaces. In this step, every rule sub-
space covered by a policy segment is assigned with a property. Four property values,
removable (R), strong irremovable (SI), weak irremovable (WI) and correlated (C),
are defined to reflect different characteristics of rule subspace. Removable property
is used to indicate that a rule subspace is removable. In other words, removing such
a rule subspace does not make any impact on the original authorization space of an
associated policy. Strong irremovable property means that a rule subspace cannot
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be removed because the effect of corresponding policy segment can be only decided
by this rule. Weak irremovable property is assigned to a rule subspace when any
subspace belonging to the same rule has strong irremovable property. That means a
rule subspace becomes irremovable due to the reason that other portions of this rule
cannot be removed. Correlated property is assigned to multiple rule subspaces cov-
ered by a policy segment, if the effect of this policy segment can be determined by
any of these rules. I next introduce three processes to perform the property assign-
ments to all of rule subspaces within the segments of a policy, considering different
categories of policy segments.
Process1: Property assignment for the rule subspace covered by a non-overlapping
segment. A non-overlapping segment contains only one rule subspace. Thus,
this rule subspace is assigned with strong irremovable property. Other rule
subspaces associated with the same rule are assigned with weak irremovable
property, excepting the rule subspaces that already have strong irremovable
property.
Process2: Property assignment for rule subspaces covered by a conflicting seg-
ment. I present this property assignment process based on the following three
cases of rule combining algorithm (CA ).
1. CA =First-Applicable: In this case, the first rule subspace covered by
the conflicting segment is assigned with strong irremovable property.
Other rule subspaces in the same segment are assigned with removable
property. Meanwhile, other rule subspaces associated with the same rule
are assigned with weak irremovable property except the rule subspaces
already having strong irremovable property.
2. CA =Permit-Overrides: All subspaces of “deny” rules in this conflict-
ing segment are assigned with removable property. If there is only
94
one “permit” rule subspace, this case is handled which is similar to
the First-Applicable case. If any “permit” rule subspace has been as-
signed with weak irremovable property, other rule subspaces without
irremovable property are assigned with removable property. Otherwise,
all “permit” rule subspaces are assigned with correlated property.
3. CA =Deny-Overrides: This case is dealt with as the same as Permit-
Overrides case.
Process3: Property assignment for rule subspaces covered by a non-conflicting
overlapping segment. If any rule subspace has been assigned with weak ir-
removable property, other rule subspaces without irremovable property are
assigned with removable property. Otherwise, all subspaces within the seg-
ment are assigned with correlated property.
Figure 4.25(b) shows the result of applying the property assignment mech-
anism, which performs three property assignment processes in sequence, to the
example presented in Figure 4.25(a). We can easily identify that r3 and r8 are re-
movable rules, where all subspaces are with removable property. However, we need
to further examine the correlated rules r2, r4 or r7, which contain some subspaces
with correlated property.
Rule Correlation Break and Redundancy Removal. Rule subspaces cov-
ered by an overlapping segment are correlated with each other when the effect of
overlapping segment can be determined by any of those correlated rules. Thus,
keeping one correlated rule and removing others may not change the effect of cor-
responding segment. Such a correlated relation is called as vertical rule correlation,
which can be identified in property assignment step. In addition, we can observe
that some rule may be involved in several correlated relations. For example, in Fig-
ure 4.25(b), r4 has two subspaces that are involved in the correlated relations with
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r2 and r7, respectively. This kind of correlated relation is called as horizontal rule
correlation. Obviously, we cannot resolve a correlation individually and those two
dimensions of rule correlation should be take into consideration. Therefore, we can
further construct rule correlation groups based on those two kinds of rule correla-
tions so that dependent relationships among multiple correlated rules within one
group can be examined together. For example, a correlation group g consisting of
three rules r2, r4 and r7 can be identified in Figure 4.25(b) based on two dimensions
of rule correlation.
Figure 4.26: Example of rule correlation break.
We can additionally observe that different sequences to break rule correla-
tions in a correlation group may lead to different results for redundancy removal.
Figure 4.26(a) shows correlated relations of rules r2, r4 and r7 in the correlation
group g. We can break their correlation relations via different sequences. Fig-
ure 4.26(b) shows one possible solution. If we first assign two subspaces of r4 with
removable property, r4 becomes a removable rule but r2 and r7 are turned to an irre-
movable rules. However, regarding another solution represented in Figure 4.26(c),
if we first assign the correlated subspace of r2 with removable property, then only r4
becomes an irremovable rule. Both r2 and r7 are removable. Thus, it is necessary to
seek an optimal solution to obtain maximum redundancy removal. To achieve this
goal, we can compute a correlation degree (CD) for each correlated rule r using the
following equation:
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Algorithm 3: Redundancy Elimination of Policy P: RedundancyEliminate P(P)
Input: A policy P with a set of rules.
Output: A redundancy-eliminated policy P0 .
1 /* Partition the entire authorization space of P into disjoint spaces*/
2 S:New();
3 S   Partition P(P);
4 /* Property assignment for all rule subspaces */
5 PropertyAssgin P(S);
6 /* Rule correlation break */
7 G   CorrelatonGroupConstruct(S);
8 foreach g 2 G do
9 foreach r 2 g do
10 r:CD   åsi2CS(r) 1NC(si) 1 ;
11 SP   GetCorrelatedSubspace(MinCDRule(g))
12 foreach sp 2 SP do
13 sp:Property   R ;
14 if jGetCorrelatedSubspace(sp)j= 1 then
15 SP
0    GetCorrelatedSubspace(sp);
16 SP
0
:Property   SI ;
17 AssginSI(SP0);
18 /*Redundancy removal */
19 P
0    P;
20 foreach r 2 P0 do
21 if AllRemovalProperty(r) = true then
22 P
0    P0 n r;
23 return P0 ;
CD(r) = å
si2CS(r)
1
NC(si) 1 (4.2)
Note thatCS(r) is a function to return all correlated segments of a rule r, and
NC(si) is a function to return the number of correlated rules within a segment si.
Since each policy segment contains multiple correlated rules (NC(si) 2), 1NC(si) 1
gives the degree of breakable correlation relations associated with a policy segment
si if we set a rule r as removable. To maximize the number of removable rules for re-
dundancy resolution,the correlation break process selects one rule with the minimal
CD as the candidate removable rule each time. For instance, applying this equa-
tion to calculate correlation degrees of three rules demonstrated in Figure 4.26(a),
CD(r2) and CD(r7) equal to 1, and CD(r4) equals to 2. Thus, we can select either
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r2 or r7 as the candidate removable rule in the first break step. Finally, two rules r2
and r7 become removable rules after breaking all correlations.
The pseudocode of the algorithm for eliminating redundancy at policy level
is shown in Algorithm 3. Figure 4.25(c) depicts the result of applying this algo-
rithm to the example given in Figure 4.25(a). Four rules r2, r3, r7 and r8 were
identified as redundant rules and removed from the policy. However, if we lever-
age traditional redundancy detection method [103, 22], which was limited to detect
pairwise redundancies, to this example, only two redundant rules r2 and r7 can be
discovered.
Redundancy Elimination at Policy Set Level Similar to the solution of conflict
detection at policy set level, we can handle the redundancy removal for a policy set
based on an XACML tree structure representation. If the children nodes of the pol-
icy set is a policy node in the tree, we perform RedundancyEliminate P() func-
tion to eliminate redundancies. Otherwise, RedundancyEliminate PS() function
is excused recursively to eliminate redundancy in a policy set component.
Figure 4.27: Example of authorization space segmentation at policy set level for
redundancy discovery and removal.
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After each component of a policy set PS performs redundancy removal, the
authorization space of PS can be then partitioned into disjoint segments by per-
forming Partition() function. Note that, in the solution for conflict detection
at policy set level, authorization subspaces of each child node are aggregated be-
fore performing space partition, because we only need to identify conflicts among
children nodes to guide the selection of policy combining algorithms for the policy
set. However, for redundancy removal at policy set level, both redundancies among
children nodes and rule (leaf node) redundancies, which may exist across multiple
policies or policy sets, should be discovered. Therefore, we keep the original seg-
ments of each child node and leverage those segments to generate the authorization
space segments of PS. Figure 4.27 demonstrates an example of authorization space
segmentation of a policy set PS with three children components P1, P2 and P3. The
authorization space segments of PS are constructed based on the original segments
of each child component. For instance, a segment s
0
2 of PS covers three policy
segments P1:s1, P2:s1 and P3:s2, where Pi:s j denotes that a segment s j belongs to a
policy Pi.
The property assignment step at policy set level is similar to the property
assignment step at policy level, except that the policy combining algorithm Only-
One-Applicable needs to be taken into consideration at policy set level. The Only-
One-Applicable case is handled similar to the First-Applicable case. We first check
whether the combining algorithm is applicable or not. If the combining algorithm is
applicable, the only-applicable subspace is assigned with strong irremovable prop-
erty. Otherwise, all subspaces within the policy set’s segment are assigned with
removable property.
I utilize a similar correlation break mechanism introduced previously to
break the correlation relations among the segments of child components of PS.
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Algorithm 4: Eliminate Redundancies of a Policy Set PS: RedundancyElimi-
nate PS(PS)
Input: A policy set PS with a set of policies or other policy sets.
Output: A redundancy-eliminated policy set PS0 .
1 E    GetChild(PS);
2 foreach e 2 E do
3 /* e is a policy*/
4 if IsPolicy(e) = true then
5 e
0    RedundancyEliminate P(e);
6 /* e is a policy set*/
7 else if IsPolicySet(e) = true then
8 e
0    RedundancyEliminate PS(e)
9 E
0    E 0 [ e0 ;
10 /* Partition the authorization space of PS into disjoint spaces*/
11 foreach e0 2 E 0 do
12 foreach s 2 GetSegment(e0) do
13 S   Partition(S;s);
14 /* Property assignment for all subspaces covered by the segments of PS */
15 PropertyAssgin PS(S);
16 /* Correlation break */
17 CorrelationBreak PS(S);
18 /*Redundancy removal for child components of PS */
19 PS
0    PS;
20 foreach e 2 PS do
21 if AllRemovalProperty(e) = true then
22 PS
0    PS0 n e;
23 /*Redundancy removal for rules of PS */
24 foreach e 2 PS0 do
25 S   GetSubspace(e);
26 foreach s 2 S do
27 if s:Property= R then
28 S   GetSubspaceWithSI(s);
29 foreach s 2 S do
30 if OneSISubspace(GetRule(s)) = true then
31 SP   GetRuleSubspace(GetRule(s))n s;
32 foreach sp 2 SP do
33 sp:Property   R ;
34 SP
0    GetSubspace(s);
35 foreach sp0 2 SP0 do
36 sp0:Property   R ;
37 foreach r 2 SP0 do
38 if AllRemovalProperty(r) = true then
39 SP
0    SP0 n r;
40 return PS0 ;
Since there may exist multiple correlated segments of children components with
the minimal correlation degree (CD) value, I additionally compute a removal value
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(RV ), which indicates the possibility of rule redundancy removal if we set a corre-
lated segment with removable property, for all candidate segments using following
equation:
RV (s) = å
ri2RHI(s)
1
NHI(ri)
(4.3)
Note that RHI(s) is a function to return all rules having a subspace in the
segment s with strong irremovable property, and NHI(ri) is a function to return the
number of the rule’s subspace with strong irremovable property. 1NHI(ri) measures
the possibility of turning a rule to a removable rule if we change a strong irremov-
able rule subspace to be removable. The correlated segment with the maximum RV
value has the highest priority to be chosen for breaking correlations.
After assigning properties to all segments of children components of PS, we
need to examine whether any child component is redundant. If a child component
is redundant, this child component and all rules contained in the child component
are removed from PS. Then, we need to examine whether there exist any redundant
rules. In this process, the properties of all rule subspaces covered by a removable
segment of a child component of PS needs to be changed to removable. Note that
when we change the property of a strong irremovable rule subspace to removable,
other subspaces in the same rule with dependent weak irremovable property need
to be changed to removable correspondingly. Algorithm 4 shows the pseudocode
of eliminating redundancies for a policy set PS.
Implementation and Evaluation
A policy analysis tool called XAnalyzer have been implemented in Java. Based
on the policy anomaly analysis mechanism, it consists of four core components:
segmentation module, effect constraint generation module, strategy mapping mod-
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ule, and property assignment module. The segmentation module takes XACML
policies as an input and identifies the authorization space segments by partitioning
the authorization space into disjoint subspaces. XAnalyzer utilizes APIs provided
by Sun XACML implementation [52] to parse the XACML policies and construct
Boolean encoding. JavaBDD [108], which is based on BuDDy package [109], is
employed by XAnalyzer to support BDD representation and authorization space
operations. The effect constraint generation module takes conflicting segments as
an input and generates effect constraints for each conflicting segment. Effect con-
straints are generated based on strategies assigned to each conflicting segment. The
strategy mapping module takes conflict correlation groups and effect constraints
of conflicting segments as inputs and then maps assigned strategies to standard
XACML combining algorithms for examined XACML policy components. The
property assignment module automatically assigns corresponding property to each
subspace covered by the segments of XACML policy components. The assigned
properties are in turn utilized to identify redundancies.
Considering the complexity of tasks involved in the policy analysis, it is de-
sirable to provide intuitive user interfaces for policy designers or administrators for
effective policy anomaly detection and resolution. Since the grid representation of
policy anomalies offers a succinct view of the interactions of overlapping rules and
enables policy designers or administrators to better understand policy anomalies,
the grid representation of policy anomalies has been implemented in XAnalyzer as
well.
XAnalyzer provides two policy viewers, Conflict Viewer (Figure 4.28(a))
and Redundancy Viewer (Figure 4.28(b)), to visualize the outputs of policy con-
flict analysis and policy redundancy analysis, respectively. In addition, XAnalyzer
offers flexible ways to handle large-scale policies. There are two kinds of visualiza-
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(a) Conflict Viewer.
(b) Redundancy Viewer.
Figure 4.28: XAnalyzer interface.
tion interfaces in each viewer: one interface shows an entire snapshot of all anoma-
lies; another interface shows a partial snapshot only containing anomalies within
one correlation group. In addition, XAnalyzer shows a hierarchical structure of
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policies and allow policy designers or administrators to view policy anomalies at
different levels independently. The hierarchical structure of policies is presented
by a tree of policy components on the left side of the interfaces. A policy designer
or administrator can choose a particular policy component such as Policy or Policy
Set node for anomaly analysis. If an administrator chooses a Policy node for the
analysis, anomalies in that particular Policy node are displayed in terms of the rule
subspaces involved. Otherwise, if an administrator chooses a Policy Set node, all
anomalies within that particular node are displayed in terms of allowed and denied
subspaces of policy or policy set components.
I evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of XAnalyzer for policy anal-
ysis on both real-life and synthetic XACML policies. The experiments were per-
formed on Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 3.00 GHz with 3.25 GB RAM running on Win-
dows XP SP2. In the evaluation, I utilized five real-life XACML policies, which
were collected from different sources. Three of the policies, CodeA, Continue-a
and Continue-b are XACML policies used in [20]; among them, Continue-a and
Continue-b are designed for a real-world Web application supporting a confer-
ence management. GradeSheet is utilized in [101]. The Pluto policy is employed
in ARCHON system, 8 which is a digital library that federates the collections of
physics with multiple degrees of meta data richness. Since it is hard to get a large
volume of real-world policies due to the reason that they are often considered to
be highly confidential, I generated four large synthetic policies SyntheticPolicy-
1, SyntheticPolicy-2, SyntheticPolicy-3 and SyntheticPolicy-4 for further evaluating
the performance and scalability of the tool. These synthetic policies are multi-
layered, where each policy component has a randomly selected combining algo-
rithm and each rule has randomly chosen attribute sets from a predefined domain.
8http://archon.cs.odu.edu/
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Table 4.4: XACML policies used for evaluation.
Policy Rule (#) Policy (#) Policy Set (#)
1 (CodeA) 4 2 5
2 (SamplePolicy) 6 2 1
3 (GradeSheet) 13 1 0
4 (Pluto) 22 1 0
5 (SyntheticPolicy-1) 147 30 11
6 (Continue-a) 312 276 111
7 (Continue-b) 336 305 111
8 (SyntheticPolicy-2) 456 65 40
9 (SyntheticPolicy-3) 572 114 75
10 (SyntheticPolicy-4) 685 188 84
I also use SamplePolicy, which is the example XACML policy represented in Fig-
ure 4.19, in the experiments. Table 4.4 summarizes the basic information of each
policy including the number of rules, the number of policies, and the number of
policy sets.
I conducted two separate sets of experiments for the evaluation of conflict
detection approach and the evaluation of redundancy removal approach, respec-
tively. Also, I performed evaluations at both policy level and policy set level. Ta-
ble 4.5 summarizes the evaluation results.
Evaluation of Conflict Detection. Time required by XAnalyzer for con-
flict detection highly depends upon the number of segments generated for each
XACML policy. The increase of the number of segments is proportional to the
number of components contained in an XACML policy. From Table 4.5, we can
observe that XAnalyzer performs fast enough to handle larger size XACML poli-
cies, even for some complex policies with multiple levels of hierarchies along with
hundreds of rules, such as two real-life XACML policies Continue-a and Continue-
b and four synthetic XACML policies. The time trends observed from Table 4.5 are
promising, and hence provide the evidence of efficiency of the conflict detection
approach.
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Table 4.5: Conflict detection and redundancy removal algorithms evaluation.
Policy Partitions BDD Conflict Detection Redundant Removal(#) Nodes (#) Policy Level(#) Policy Set Level(#) Time (s) Policy Level(#) Policy Set Level(#) Time (s)
1 (CodeA) 6 16 1 1 0.082 1 0 0.087
2 (SamplePolicy) 8 34 0 2 0.090 0 2 0.095
3 (GradeSheet) 18 45 0 4 0.098 0 2 0.113
4 (Pluto) 34 78 0 5 0.136 0 3 0.147
5 (SyntheticPolicy-1) 205 112 8 14 0.329 7 4 0.158
6 (Continue-a) 439 135 9 17 0.583 11 7 0.214
7 (Continue-b) 468 146 10 21 0.635 12 7 0.585
8 (SyntheticPolicy-2) 523 209 29 17 0.896 14 8 0.623
9 (SyntheticPolicy-3) 614 227 39 19 0.948 17 10 0.672
10 (SyntheticPolicy-4) 814 265 56 19 1.123 23 12 0.803
(a) Redundancy elimination rate. (b) Performance improvement.
Figure 4.29: Evaluation of redundancy removal approach.
Evaluation of Redundancy Removal. In the second set of experiments, I
evaluated the proposed redundancy analysis approach based on those experimental
XACML policies. The evaluation results shown in Table 4.5 also indicate the effi-
ciency of the redundancy analysis algorithm. Moreover, I conducted the evaluation
of effectiveness by comparing the redundancy analysis approach with traditional
redundancy analysis approach [103, 22], which can only identify redundancy rela-
tions between two rules. Figure 4.29(a) depicts the results of the comparison exper-
iments. From Figure 4.29(a), we can observe that XAnalyzer could identify that
an average of 6.3% of total rules are redundant. However, traditional redundancy
analysis approach could only detect an average 3.7% of total rules as redundant
rules. Therefore, the enhancement for redundancy elimination was clearly observed
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through comparing the proposed redundancy analysis approach with traditional re-
dundancy analysis approach in the experiments.
Furthermore, when redundancies in a policy are removed, the performance
of policy enforcement is improved generally. For each of XACML policies in
the experiments, Figure 4.29(b) depicts the total processing time in Sun XACML
PDP [52] for responding 10,000 randomly generated XACML requests. The eval-
uation results clearly show that the processing times are reduced after eliminating
redundancies in XACML policies applying either traditional approach or this ap-
proach, and this approach can obtain better performance improvement than tradi-
tional approach.
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Chapter 5
Applying AMF to Online Social Networks
Online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Google+, and Twitter are in-
herently designed to enable people to share personal and public information and
make social connections with friends, coworkers, colleagues, family and even with
strangers. In recent years, we have seen unprecedented growth in the application of
OSNs. For example, Facebook, one of representative social network sites, claims
that it has more than 800 million active users and over 30 billion pieces of con-
tent (web links, news stories, blog posts, notes, photo albums, etc.) shared each
month [110]. To protect user data, access control has become a central feature of
OSNs [111, 112].
A typical OSN provides each user with a virtual space containing profile
information, a list of the user’s friends, and web pages, such as wall in Facebook,
where users and friends can post content and leave messages. A user profile usually
includes information with respect to the user’s birthday, gender, interests, education
and work history, and contact information. In addition, users can not only upload a
content into their own or others’ spaces but also tag other users who appear in the
content. Each tag is an explicit reference that links to a user’s space. For the pro-
tection of user data, current OSNs indirectly require users to be system and policy
administrators for regulating their data, where users can restrict data sharing to a
specific set of trusted users. OSNs often use user relationship and group member-
ship to distinguish between trusted and untrusted users. For example, in Facebook,
users can allow friends, friends of friends, groups or public to access their data,
depending on their personal authorization and privacy requirements.
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Although OSNs currently provide simple access control mechanisms allow-
ing users to govern access to information contained in their own spaces, users, un-
fortunately, have no control over data residing outside their spaces. For instance, if
a user posts a comment in a friend’s space, s/he cannot specify which users can view
the comment. In another case, when a user uploads a photo and tags friends who
appear in the photo, the tagged friends cannot restrict who can see this photo, even
though the tagged friends may have different privacy concerns about the photo. To
address such a critical issue, preliminary protection mechanisms have been offered
by existing OSNs. For example, Facebook allows tagged users to remove the tags
linked to their profiles or report violations asking Facebook managers to remove
the contents that they do not want to share with the public. However, these simple
protection mechanisms suffer from several limitations. On one hand, removing a
tag from a photo can only prevent other members from seeing a user’s profile by
means of the association link, but the user’s image is still contained in the photo.
Since original access control policies cannot be changed, the user’s image continues
to be revealed to all authorized users. On the other hand, reporting to OSNs only
allows users to either keep or delete the content. Such a binary decision from OSN
managers is either too loose or too restrictive, relying on the OSN’s administration
and requiring several people to report their request on the same content. Hence, it is
essential to develop an effective and flexible access control mechanism for OSNs,
accommodating the special authorization requirements coming from multiple asso-
ciated users for managing the shared data collaboratively.
In Chapter 4, I demonstrated the proposed AMF framework with the real-
ization and analysis of access control models, and the representation and analysis of
access control policies, separately. However, there is no obvious connection among
the adopted formal access control models, such as NIST/ANSI RBAC standard,
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and access control policies, such as XACML policies. In this part, I will evaluate
the AMF framework using an access control model and associated access control
policies through modeling and analyzing multiparty access control in OSNs. I be-
gin by examining how the lack of multiparty access control for data sharing in
OSNs can undermine the protection of user data. Some typical data sharing pat-
terns with respect to multiparty authorization in OSNs are also identified. Based
on these sharing patterns, a multiparty access control (MPAC) model is formulated
to capture the core features of multiparty authorization requirements which have
not been accommodated so far by existing access control systems and models for
OSNs (e.g., [28, 29, 30, 31, 70]). The model also contains a multiparty policy spec-
ification scheme. In the meanwhile, a systematic conflict detection and resolution
mechanism is addressed to cope with privacy conflicts occurring in collaborative
management of data sharing in OSNs. The conflict resolution approach in this
work balances the need for privacy protection and the users’ desire for information
sharing by quantitative analysis of privacy risk and sharing loss.
Another compelling feature of the proposed solution is the support of analy-
sis on multiparty access control model and systems. The correctness of implemen-
tation of an access control model is based on the premise that the access control
model is valid. Moreover, while the use of multiparty access control mechanism can
greatly enhance the flexibility for regulating data sharing in OSNs, it may poten-
tially reduce the certainty of system authorization consequences due to the reason
that authorization and privacy conflicts need to be resolved elegantly. Assessing
the implications of access control mechanisms traditionally relies on the security
analysis technique, which has been applied in several domains (e.g., operating sys-
tems [113], trust management [114], and role-based access control [115, 116]). I
additionally introduce a method to represent and reason about the model in a logic
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(a) A disseminator shares other’s profile. (b) A user shares her/his relationships.
Figure 5.1: Multiparty access control pattern for profile and relationship sharing.
program. Besides, a proof-of-concept prototype of the approach is implemented
in the context of Facebook. The experimental results based on comprehensive sys-
tem evaluation and usability study demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of the
proposed solution.
5.1 Multiparty Access Control for OSNs: Requirements and Patterns
In this section, I proceed with a comprehensive requirement analysis of multiparty
access control in OSNs. Meanwhile, I discuss several typical sharing patterns oc-
curring in OSNs where multiple users may have different authorization require-
ments to a single resource. I specifically analyze three scenarios—profile sharing,
relationship sharing and content sharing—to understand the risks posted by the lack
of collaborative control in OSNs. I leverage Facebook as the running example in
this work since it is currently the most popular and representative social network
provider. In the meantime, I reiterate that the proposed solution could be easily
extended to other existing social network platforms, such as Google+ [117].
Profile sharing: An appealing feature of some OSNs is to support social ap-
plications written by third-party developers to create additional functionalities built
on the top of users’ profile for OSNs [118]. To provide meaningful and attractive
services, these social applications consume user profile attributes, such as name,
birthday, activities, interests, and so on. To make matters more complicated, social
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applications on current OSN platforms can also consume the profile attributes of
a user’s friends. In this case, users can select particular pieces of profile attributes
they are willing to share with the applications when their friends use the applica-
tions. At the same time, the users who are using the applications may also want
to control what information of their friends is available to the applications since it
is possible for the applications to infer their private profile attributes through their
friends’ profile attributes [119]. This means that when an application accesses the
profile attributes of a user’s friend, both the user and her friend want to gain con-
trol over the profile attributes. If we consider the application is an accessor, the
user is a disseminator and the user’s friend is the owner of shared profile attributes
in this scenario, Figure 5.1(a) demonstrates a profile sharing pattern where a dis-
seminator can share others’ profile attributes to an accessor. Both the owner and
the disseminator can specify access control policies to restrict the sharing of profile
attributes.
Relationship sharing: Another feature of OSNs is that users can share their
relationships with other members. Relationships are inherently bidirectional and
carry potentially sensitive information that associated users may not want to dis-
close. Most OSNs provide mechanisms that users can regulate the display of their
friend lists. A user, however, can only control one direction of a relationship. Con-
sider, for example, a scenario where a user Alice specifies a policy to hide her friend
list from the public. However, Bob, one of Alice’s friends, specifies a weaker policy
that permits his friend list visible to anyone. In this case, if OSNs can solely en-
force one party’s policy, the relationship between Alice and Bob can still be learned
through Bob’s friend list. Figure 5.1(b) shows a relationship sharing pattern where
a user called owner, who has a relationship with another user called stakeholder,
shares the relationship with an accessor. In this scenario, authorization require-
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(a) A shared content has multiple stakehold-
ers.
(b) A shared content is published by a con-
tributor.
(c) A disseminator shares other’s content published by a
contributor.
Figure 5.2: Multiparty access control pattern for content sharing.
ments from both the owner and the stakeholder should be considered. Otherwise,
the stakeholder’s privacy concern may be violated.
Content sharing: OSNs provide built-in mechanisms enabling users to com-
municate and share contents with other members. OSN users can post statuses and
notes, upload photos and videos in their own spaces, tag others to their contents,
and share the contents with their friends. On the other hand, users can also post
contents in their friends’ spaces. The shared contents may be connected with mul-
tiple users. Consider an example where a photograph contains three users, Alice,
Bob and Carol. If Alice uploads it to her own space and tags both Bob and Carol
in the photo, we call Alice the owner of the photo, and Bob and Carol stakehold-
ers of the photo. All of them may specify access control policies to control over
who can see this photo. Figure 5.2(a) depicts a content sharing pattern where the
owner of a content shares the content with other OSN members, and the content
has multiple stateholders who may also want to involve in the control of content
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sharing. In another case, when Alice posts a note stating “I will attend a party on
Friday night with @Carol” to Bob’s space, we call Alice the contributor of the note
and she may want to make the control over her notes. In addition, since Carol is
explicitly identified by @-mention (at-mention) in this note, she is considered as
a stakeholder of the note and may also want to control the exposure of this note.
Figure 5.2(b) shows a content sharing pattern reflecting this scenario where a con-
tributor publishes a content to other’s space and the content may also have multiple
stakeholders (e.g., tagged users). All associated users should be allowed to define
access control policies for the shared content.
OSNs also enable users to share others’ contents. For example, when Alice
views a photo in Bob’s space and decides to share this photo with her friends, the
photo will be in turn posted in her space and she can specify access control policy
to authorize her friends to see this photo. In this case, Alice is a disseminator of
the photo. Since Alice may adopt a weaker control saying the photo is visible to
everyone, the initial access control requirements of this photo should be compliant
with, preventing from the possible leakage of sensitive information via the proce-
dure of data dissemination. Figure 5.2(c) shows a content sharing pattern where the
sharing starts with an originator (owner or contributor who uploads the content)
publishing the content, and then a disseminator views and shares the content. All
access control policies defined by associated users should be enforced to regulate
access of the content in disseminator’s space. For a more complicated case, the dis-
seminated content may be further re-disseminated by disseminator’s friends, where
effective access control mechanisms should be applied in each procedure to regulate
sharing behaviors. Especially, regardless of how many steps the content has been
re-disseminated, the original access control policies should be always enforced to
protect further dissemination of the content.
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5.2 Modeling Multiparty Access Control for OSNs
In this section, I discuss the formalization of a MultiParty Access Control (MPAC)
model for OSNs and a policy scheme for the specification of MPAC policies in
OSNs.
MPAC Model
An OSN can be represented by a relationship network, a set of user groups and a
collection of user data. The relationship network of an OSN is a directed labeled
graph, where each node denotes a user and each edge represents a relationship
between two users. The label associated with each edge indicates the type of the
relationship. Edge direction denotes that the initial node of an edge establishes the
relationship and the terminal node of the edge accepts the relationship. The number
and type of supported relationships rely on the specific OSNs and its purposes.
Besides, OSNs include an important feature that allows users to be organized in
groups [120, 121] (or called circles in Google+ [122]), where each group has a
unique name. This feature enables users of an OSN to easily find other users with
whom they might share specific interests (e.g., same hobbies), demographic groups
(e.g., studying at the same schools), political orientation, and so on. Users can join
in groups without any approval from other group members. Furthermore, OSNs
provide each member a Web space where users can store and manage their personal
data including profile information, friend list and content.
Recently, several access control schemes (e.g., [28, 29, 30, 31]) have been
proposed to support fine-grained authorization specifications for OSNs. Unfortu-
nately, these schemes can only allow a single controller, the resource owner, to
specify access control policies. Indeed, a flexible access control mechanism in a
multi-user environment like OSNs should allow multiple controllers, who are as-
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sociated with the shared data, to specify access control policies. As I identified
previously in the sharing patterns (Section 5.1), in addition to the owner of data,
other controllers, including the contributor, stakeholder and disseminator of data,
need to regulate the access of the shared data as well. I define these controllers as
follows:
Definition 6 (Owner). Let d be a data item in the space of a user u in the social
network. The user u is called the owner of d.
Definition 7 (Contributor). Let d be a data item published by a user u in someone
else’s space in the social network. The user u is called the contributor of d.
Definition 8 (Stakeholder). Let d be a data item in the space of a user in the social
network. Let T be the set of tagged users associated with d. A user u is called a
stakeholder of d, if u 2 T .
Definition 9 (Disseminator). Let d be a data item shared by a user u from someone
else’s space to his/her space in the social network. The user u is called a dissemi-
nator of d.
I now formally define the MPAC model as follows:
• U = fu1; : : : ;ung is a set of users of the OSN. Each user has a unique identi-
fier;
• G= fg1; : : : ;gng is a set of groups to which the users can belong. Each group
also has a unique identifier;
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• P= fp1; : : : ; png is a collection of user profile sets, where pi = fqi1; : : : ;qimg
is the profile of a user i 2 U . Each profile entry is a <attribute: profile-
value> pair, qi j =< attr j : pvalue j >, where attr j is an attribute identifier
and pvalue j is the attribute value;
• RT is a set of relationship types supported by the OSN. Each user in an OSN
may be connected with others by relationships of different types;
• R= fr1; : : : ;rng is a collection of user relationship sets, where ri= fsi1; : : : ;simg
is the relationship list of a user i 2 U . Each relationship entry is a <user:
relationship-type> pair, si j =< u j : rt j >, where u j 2U , rt j 2 RT ;
• C = fc1; : : : ;cng is a collection of user content sets, where ci = fei1; : : : ;eimg
is a set of contents of a user i 2U , where ei j is a content identifier;
• D= fd1; : : : ;dng is a collection of data sets, where di = pi[ ri[ ci is a set of
data of a user i 2U ;
• CT = fOW;CB;ST;DSg is a set of controller types, indicating ownerOf, con-
tributorOf, stakeholderOf, and disseminatorOf, respectively;
• UU = fUUrt1; : : : ;UUrtng is a collection of uni-directional binary user-to-user
relations, whereUUrti UU specifies the pairs of users having relationship
type rti 2 RT ;
• UGUG is a set of binary user-to-group membership relations;
• UD= fUDct1; : : : ;UDctng is a collection of binary user-to-data relations, where
UDcti U D specifies a set of < user;data > pairs having controller type
cti 2CT ;
• relation members :U RT ! 2U ; a function mapping each user u 2U to a set of
users with whom s/he has a relationship rt 2 RT :
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Figure 5.3: An example of multiparty social network representation.
relation members(u :U;rt : RT ) = fu0 2U j (u;u0) 2UUrtg;
• ROR members : U RT ! 2U ; a function mapping each user u 2 U to a set of
users with whom s/he has a transitive relation of a relationship rt 2 RT , de-
noted as relationships-of-relationships (ROR). For example, if a relationship
is friend, then its transitive relation is friends-of-friends (FOF):
ROR members(u : U;rt : RT ) = fu0 2 U j u0 2 relation members(u;rt)_
(9u00 2U [u00 2 ROR members(u;rt))^u0 2 ROR members(u00;rt)]g;
• controllers : D CT  ! 2U ; a function mapping each date item d 2 D to a set of
users who are the controller with the controller type ct 2CT :
controllers(d : D;ct :CT ) = fu 2U j (u;d) 2UDctg; and
• group members : G! 2U ; a function mapping each group g 2 G to a set of
users who belong to the group:
group members(g : G) = fu 2U j (u;g) 2UGg;
groups(u :U) = fg 2 G j (u;g) 2UGg;
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Figure 5.3 depicts an example of multiparty social network representation.
It describes relationships of five individuals, Alice (A), Bob (B), Carol (C), Dave
(D) and Edward (E), along with their relations with data and their groups of in-
terest. Note that two users may be directly connected by more than one edge
labeled with different relationship types in the relationship network. For exam-
ple, in Figure 5.3, Alice (A) has a direct relationship of type colleagueOf with
Bob (B), whereas Bob (B) has a relationship of friendOf with Alice (A). In addi-
tion, two users may have transitive relationship, such as friends-of-friends (FOF),
colleagues-of-colleagues (COC) and classmates-of-classmates (LOL) in this exam-
ple. Moreover, this example shows that some data items have multiple controllers.
For instance, RelationshipA has two controllers: the owner, Alice (A) and a stake-
holder, Carol (C). Also, some users may be the controllers of multiple data items.
For example, Carol (C) is a stakeholder of RelationshipA as well as the contributor
of ContentE . Furthermore, we can notice there are two groups in this example that
users can participate in: the “Fashion” group and the “Hiking” group, and some
users, such as Bob (B) and Dave (D), may join in multiple groups.
MPAC Policy Specification
To enable a collaborative authorization management of data sharing in OSNs, it
is essential for multiparty access control policies to be in place to regulate access
over shared data, representing authorization requirements from multiple associated
users. The policy specification scheme is built upon the proposed MPAC model.
Accessor Specification: Accessors are a set of users who are granted to access
the shared data. Accessors can be represented with a set of user names, a set of
relationship names or a set of group names in OSNs. The accessor specification is
formally defined as follows:
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Definition 10 (Accessor Specification). Let ac 2U [RT [G be a user u 2U, a
relationship type rt 2 RT , or a group g 2 G. Let at 2 fUN;RN;GNg be the type
of the accessor specification (user name, relationship type, and group name, re-
spectively). The accessor specification is defined as a set, accessors= fa1; : : : ;ang,
where each element is a tuple < ac;at >.
Data Specification: In OSNs, user data is composed of three types of information,
user profile, user relationship and user content.
To facilitate effective privacy conflict resolution for multiparty access con-
trol, I introduce sensitivity levels for data specification, which are assigned by the
controllers to the shared data items. A user’s judgment of the sensitivity level of
the data is not binary (private/public), but multi-dimensional with varying degrees
of sensitivity. Formally, the data specification is defined as follows:
Definition 11 (Data Specification). Let dt 2 D be a data item. Let sl be a sensi-
tivity level, which is a rational number in the range [1,5], assigned to dt. The data
specification is defined as a tuple < dt;sl >.
Access Control Policy: To summarize the above-mentioned policy elements, I in-
troduce the definition of a multiparty access control policy as follows:
Definition 12 (MPACPolicy). A multiparty access control policy is a 4-tuple P=<
controller;accessor;data;e f f ect >, where
• controller is defined as a 2-tuple < cn;ct >, where cn 2U is a user who can
regulate the access of data, and ct 2CT is the type of the cn;
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• accessor is a set of users to whom the authorization is granted, representing
with an access specification defined in Definition 10.
• data is represented with a data specification defined in Definition 11; and
• e f f ect 2 fpermit;denyg is the authorization effect of the policy.
Suppose a controller can leverage five sensitivity levels: 1 (lowest), 2 (low),
3 (medium), 4 (high), and 5 (highest) for the shared data. I give a motivating ex-
ample to demonstrate how multiple controllers are able to specify their privacy
concerns over a shared content as follows:
Example 3 There is a shared photo, funny.jpg, in the social network. Alice is the
owner of this photo, and Bob and Carol are two stakeholders of this photo. Alice
authorizes her friends to view this photo and she considers the photo has a high
sensitivity level; Bob allows the users in hiking group to access this photo and he
considers the photo has a medium sensitivity level; and Carol permits her friends
of friends to see this photo and she considers the photo has a high sensitivity level.
These policies are expressed as:
p1 = (<Alice, OW>, f< f riendO f , RN>g, < f unny: jpg, 4>, permit).
p2 = (<Bob, ST>, f<hiking, GN>g, < f unny: jpg, 3>, permit).
p3 = (<Carol, ST>, f< f riendO fFriend, RN>g, < f unny: jpg, 4>, permit).
5.3 Identifying and Resolving Privacy Conflicts
When two users disagree on whom the shared data item should be exposed to, we
say a privacy conflict occurs. The essential reason leading to the privacy conflicts
is that multiple associated users of the shared data item often have different privacy
concerns over the data item. For example, assume that Alice and Bob are two
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controllers of a photo. Each of them defines a privacy policy stating only her/his
friends can view this photo. Since it is almost impossible that Alice and Bob have
the same set of friends, privacy conflicts may always exist considering collaborative
control over the shared data item.
A naive solution for resolving multiparty privacy conflicts is to only allow
the common users of accessor sets defined by the multiple controllers to access the
data [79]. Unfortunately, this solution is too restrictive in many cases and may not
produce desirable results for resolving multiparty privacy conflicts. Let’s consider
an example that four users, Alice, Bob, Carol and Dave, are the controllers of a
photo, and each of them allows her/his friends to see the photo. Suppose that Alice,
Bob and Carol are close friends and have many common friends, but Dave has no
common friends with them and has a pretty weak privacy concern on the photo. In
this case, adopting the naive solution for conflict resolution may turn out that no one
can access this photo. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to give the view permission to
the common friends of Alice, Bob and Carol. A strong conflict resolution strategy
may provide a better privacy protection. Meanwhile, it may reduce the social value
of data sharing in OSNs. Therefore, it is important to consider the tradeoff between
privacy protection and data sharing when resolving privacy conflicts. To address
this issue, I introduce a mechanism for identifying multiparty privacy conflicts, as
well as a systematic solution for resolving multiparty privacy conflicts.
Privacy Conflict Identification
Through specifying the access control policies to reflect the privacy concern, each
controller of the shared data item defines a set of trusted users who can access the
data item. The set of trusted users represents an accessor space for the controller.
I adopt a space segmentation approach [123] introduced in Section 4.3 to partition
accessor spaces of all controllers of a shared data item into disjoint segments. Then,
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Algorithm 5: Identification of Conflicting Accessor Space
Input: A set of accessor space, A.
Output: A set of disjoined conflicting accessor spaces, CS.
1 /* Partition the entire accessor space */
2 S   Partition(A);
3 /* Identify the conflicting segments */
4 CS:New();
5 foreach s 2 S do
6 /* Get all controllers associated with a segment s */
7 C   GetControllers(s);
8 if jCj< jAj then
9 CS:Append(s);
10 Partition(A)
11 foreach a 2 A do
12 sa    FriendSet(a);
13 foreach s 2 S do
14 /* sa is a subset of s*/
15 if sa  s then
16 S:Append(sn sa);
17 s   sa;
18 Break;
19 /* sa is a superset of s*/
20 else if sa  s then
21 sa    sa n s;
22 /* sa partially matches s*/
23 else if sa\ s 6= /0 then
24 S:Append(sn sa);
25 s   sa\ s;
26 sa    sa n s;
27 S:Append(sa);
28 return S;
conflicting accessor space segments called conflicting segments, which contain ac-
cessors that some controllers of the shared data item do not trust, are identified.
Each conflicting segment contains at least one privacy conflict. Algorithm 5 shows
the pseudocode of generating conflicting accessor space segments for all controllers
of a shared data item.
Figure 5.4 gives an example of identifying privacy conflicts based on ac-
cessor space segmentation. I use circles to represent accessor spaces of three con-
trollers, c1, c2 and c3, of a shared data item. We can notice that three of accessor
spaces overlap with each other, indicating that some accessors within the overlap-
ping spaces are trusted by multiple controllers. After performing the space seg-
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Figure 5.4: Example of privacy conflict identification based on accessor space seg-
mentation.
mentation, seven disjoint accessor space segments are generated as shown in Fig-
ure 5.4 (a). To represent privacy conflicts in an intuitive way, I additionally in-
troduce a grid representation of privacy conflicts, in which space segments are dis-
played along the horizontal axis of a matrix, controllers are shown along the vertical
axis of the matrix, and the intersection of a segment and a controller is a grid that
displays the accessor subspace covered by the segment. I classify the accessor space
segments as two categories: non-conflicting segment and conflicting segment. Non-
conflicting segment covers all controllers’ access spaces, which means any accessor
within the segment is trusted by all controllers of the shared data item, indicating no
privacy conflict occurs. A conflicting segment does not contain all controllers’ ac-
cess spaces that means accessors in the segment are untrusted by some controllers.
Each untrusting controller points out a privacy conflict. Figure 5.4 (b) shows a grid
representation of privacy conflicts for the example. We can easily identify that the
segment ps is a non-conflicting segment, and cs1 through cs6 are conflicting seg-
ments, where cs1, cs2 and cs3 indicate one privacy conflict, respectively, and cs4,
cs5 and cs6 are associated with two privacy conflicts, respectively.
Privacy Conflict Resolution
The process of privacy conflict resolution makes a decision to allow or deny the
accessors within the conflicting segments to access the shared data item. In general,
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allowing the assessors contained in conflicting segments to access the data itemmay
cause privacy risk, but denying a set of accessors in conflicting segments to access
the data item may result in sharing loss. The proposed privacy conflict resolution
approach attempts to find an optimal tradeoff between privacy protection and data
sharing.
Measuring Privacy Risk: The privacy risk of a conflicting segment is an indicator
of potential threat to the privacy of controllers in terms of the shared data item: the
higher the privacy risk of a conflicting segment, the higher the threat to controllers’
privacy. The basic premises for the measurement of privacy risk for a conflicting
segment are the following: (a) the lower the number of controllers who trust the
accessors within the conflicting segment, the higher the privacy risk; (b) the stronger
the general privacy concerns of controllers, the higher the privacy risk; (c) the more
sensitive the shared data item, the higher the privacy risk; and (d) the wider the data
item spreads, the higher the privacy risk.
Therefore, the privacy risk of a conflicting segment is calculated by a mono-
tonically increasing function with the following parameters:
• Number of privacy conflicts: The number of privacy conflicts in a conflicting
segment is indicated by the number of the untrusting controllers. The untrust-
ing controllers of a conflict segment i are returned by a function controllersut(i);
• General privacy concern of an untrusting controller: The general privacy
concern of an untrusting controller j is denoted as pc j in the range [1, 5].
The general privacy concern of a controller can be derived from her/his de-
fault privacy setting for data sharing. Different controllers may have different
general privacy concern with respect to the same kinds of data. For example,
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public figures may have higher privacy concern on their shared photos than
ordinary people;
• Sensitivity of the data item: Data sensitivity in a way defines controllers’ per-
ceptions of the confidentiality of the data being transmitted. The sensitivity
level of the shared data item explicitly chosen by an untrusting controller j
is denoted as sl j in the range [1, 5]. The factor depends on the untrusting
controllers themselves. Some untrusting controllers may consider the shared
data item with the higher sensitivity; and
• Visibility of the data item: The visibility of the data item with respect to a
conflicting segment captures how many accessors are contained in the seg-
ment i, denoted as ni. The more the accessors in the segment, the higher the
visibility.
The privacy risk of a conflict segment i due to an untrusting controller j,
denoted as PR(i; j), is defined as
PR(i; j) = pc j
 sl j (5.1)
where, operator 
 is used to represent any arbitrary combination functions. For
simplicity, I utilize the product operator.
In order to measure the overall privacy risk of a conflicting segment i, de-
noted as PR(i), we can use following equation to aggregate the privacy risks of i
due to different untrusting controllers. Note that we can also use any combination
function to combine the per-controller privacy risk. For simplicity, I employ the
summation operator here.
PR(i) = ni å
j2controllersut(i)
(pc j sl j) (5.2)
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Measuring Sharing Loss: When the decision of privacy conflict resolution for a
conflicting segment is “deny”, it may cause losses in potential data sharing, since
there are controllers expecting to allow the accessors in the conflicting segment to
access the data item. Similar to the measurement of the privacy risk, five factors are
adopted to measure the sharing loss for a conflicting segment. Compared with the
factors used for quantifying the privacy risk, the only difference is that I will utilize
a factor, number of trusting controllers, to replace the factor, number of privacy
conflicts (untrusting controllers), for evaluating the sharing loss of a conflicting
segment. The overall sharing loss SL(i) of a conflicting segment i is computed as
follows:
SL(i) = ni å
j2controllerst(i)
(5  pc j) (5  sl j) (5.3)
where, function controllerst(i) returns all trusting controllers of a segment i.
Conflict Resolution on the Tradeoff between Privacy Protection and Data Shar-
ing: The tradeoff between privacy and utility in data publishing has been recently
studied [124, 125]. Inspired by those work, I introduce a mechanism to balance
privacy protection and data sharing for an effective privacy conflict resolution in
OSNs.
An optimal solution for privacy conflict resolution should cause a little more
privacy risk when allowing the accessors in some conflicting segments to access the
data item, and gets lesser loss in data sharing when denying the accessors to access
the shared data item. Thus, for each conflict resolution solution s, a resolving score
RS(s) can be calculated using the following equation:
RS(s) =
1
aåi12CSsp PR(i1)+b åi22CSsd SL(i2)
(5.4)
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where, CSsp and CS
s
d denote permitted conflicting segments and denied conflicting
segments respectively in the conflict resolution solution s. And a and b are prefer-
ence weights for the privacy risk and the sharing loss, 0 a ;b  1 and a+b = 1.
Then, the optimal conflict resolution CRopt on the tradeoff between privacy
risk and sharing loss can be identified by finding the maximum resolving score:
CRopt =max
s
RS(s) (5.5)
To find the maximum resolving score, we can first calculate the privacy risk
(PR(i)) and the sharing loss (SL(i)) for each conflict segment (i), individually. Fi-
nally, following equation can be utilized to make the decisions (permitting or deny-
ing conflicting segments) for privacy conflict resolution, guaranteeing to always
find an optimal solution.
Decision=
8><>: Permit if aSL(i) bPR(i)Deny if aSL(i)< bPR(i) (5.6)
where, a and b are preference weights for the privacy risk and the sharing
loss, 0 a ;b  1 and a+b = 1.
Generating Conflict-Resolved Policy
Once the privacy conflicts are resolved, we can aggregate accessors in permitted
conflicting segmentsCSp and accessors in the non-conflicting segment ps (in which
accessors should be always allowed to access the shared data item) together to gen-
erate a new accessor list (AL) as follows:
AL= (
[
i2CSp
Accessors(i))[Accessors(ps) (5.7)
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Using the example shown in Figure 5.4, assume that cs1 and cs3 become
permitted conflicting segments after resolving the privacy conflicts. Therefore, the
aggregated accessor list can be derived as AL= Accessors(cs1)[Accessors(cs3)[
Accessors(ps). Finally, the aggregated accessor list is used to construct a conflict-
resolved privacy policy for the shared data item. The generated policy will be lever-
aged to evaluate all access requests toward the data item.
5.4 Logical Representation and Analysis of Multiparty Access Control
In this section, I adopt answer set programming (ASP), a recent form of declarative
programming [26, 27], to formally represent the model, which essentially provide
a formal foundation of the model in terms of ASP-based representation. Then, I
demonstrate how the correctness analysis and authorization analysis [126] of mul-
tiparty access control can be carried out based on such a logical representation.
Representing Multiparty Access Control in ASP
I introduce the logical representation of MPAC model/policy and MPAC privacy
conflict detection/resolution.
Logical Representation of MPAC Model and Policy
The basic components and relations in the OSN representation can be directly de-
fined with corresponding predicates in ASP. The OSN representation supports tran-
sitive relationships. For example, David is a friend of Allice, and Edward is a friend
of David in a social network. Then, we call Edward is a friends of friends of Allice.
The friend relation between two users Allice and David is represented in ASP as
follows:
f riend(Allice;David):
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It is known that the transitive closure (e.g., reachability) cannot be expressed
in first-order logic [26], however, it can be easily handled in the stable model se-
mantics. Then, friends-of-friends can be represented with ASP as follows:
f riendO fFriend(X ;Y ) f riend(X ;Y ):
f riendO fFriend(X ;Z) f riend(X ;Y )^ f riend(Y;Z)^X 6= Z:
The translation module converts a multiparty authorization policy
(hcn;cti;fhac1;at1i; : : : ;hacn;atnig;hd;sli;e f f ect)
into three ASP rule
sensitivityLevel(cn;d;sl):
decision(cn;U;d;e f f ect) 
_
1kn
ack(cn;X)^ ct(cn;d):
decision(cn;U;d;e f f ect) :decision(cn;U;d;e f f ect):
where if e f f ect is permit then e f f ect is deny and vise versa. Then, three privacy
policies in Example 3 can be represented in ASP as follows:
%P1
sensitivityLevel(alice,funny.jpg,4).
decision(alice,U,funny.jpg,permit) <- owner(alice,funny.jpg)
& friend(alice,U).
decision(alice,U,funny.jpg,deny) <- not decision(alice,U,funny.jpg,
permit).
%P2
sensitivityLevel(bob,funny.jpg,3).
decision(bob,U,funny.jpg,permit) <- stakeholder(bob,funny.jpg) &
memberOf(U, hikingGroup).
decision(bob,U,funny.jpg,deny) <- not decision(bob,U,funny.jpg,
permit).
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%P3
sensitivityLevel(carol,funny.jpg,4).
decision(carol,U,funny.jpg,permit) <- stakeholder(carol,funny.jpg) &
friendOfFriend(carol,U).
decision(carol,U,funny.jpg,deny) <- not decision(carol,U,funny.jpg,
permit).
Logical Representation of Privacy Conflict Detection and Resolution
Privacy conflicts can be also identified by logic-based reasoning. Suppose Fig-
ure 5.4 represents the accessor space segmentation of the tree policies defined by
three controllers, Alice (c1), Bob (c2) and Carol (c3), in Example 3. Accessors in
the conflicting segment cs1 are permitted by Alice and Bob, and denied by Carol.
Then, we can identify this conflicting segment with the following ASP program:
cs(1,U) <- decision(alice,U,funny.jpg,permit) & decision(bob,U,funny.jpg,
permit) & decision(carol,U,funny.jpg,deny).
The aggregation of privacy risks can be computed naturally using the aggre-
gate functions in ASP as follows:
pr(I,Val) <- Sigma = #sum [sensitivityLevel(U1,d,SL) : decision(U1,U,d,deny)
= (pc*SL)]& N = #count {cs(I,U1): user(U1)} & Val=Sigma*N & cs(I,U).
Similarly, sharing lost can be computed using ASP rules as follows:
sl(I,Val) <- Sigma = #sum [sensitivityLevel(U1,d,SL) : decision(U1,U,d,deny)
= (5-pc)*(5-SL)] & N = #count {cs(I,U1): user(U1)} & Val=Sigma*N & cs(I,U).
Reasoning about Multiparty Access Control
One of the promising advantages in logic-based representation of access control
is that formal reasoning of the authorization properties can be achieved. Once we
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represent the multiparty access control model into an ASP program, we can use
off-the-shelf ASP solvers to carry out automated authorization analysis tasks.
Authorization analysis is employed to examine over-sharing (does current
authorization state disclose the data to some users undesirable?) and under-sharing
(does current authorization state disallow some users to access the data that they
are supposed to be allowed?). This analysis service should be incorporated into
OSN systems to enable users checking potential authorization impacts derived from
collaborative control of shared data.
Example 4 (Checking over-sharing) Alice has defined a policy to disallow her fam-
ily members to see a photo, party.jpg. Then, she wants to check if any family mem-
bers can see this photo after applying conflict resolution mechanism for collab-
orative authorization management considering different privacy preferences from
multiple controllers. The input query can be represented as follows:
denyBy(Alice,U) <- decision(Alice,U,party.jpg,deny) & permit(N1) & cs(N1,U).
If any answer set is found, it means that there are family members who can
see the photo. Thus, from the perspective of Alice’s authorization, this photo is over
shared to some users.
Example 5 (Checking under-sharing) Bob has defined a policy to authorize his
friends to see a photo, funny.jpg. He wants to check if any friends cannot see this
photo in current system. The input query can be specified as follows:
permitBy(Bob,U) <- decision(Alice,U,funny.jpg,permit) & deny(N1) & cs(N1,U).
If an answer set contains check, this means that there are friends who cannot
view the photo. Regarding Bob’s authorization requirement, this photo is under
shared with his friends.
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In addition to the authorization analysis, the individual privacy risk and shar-
ing lost for each controller can be also calculated by the logic-based reasoning. For
instance, the privacy risk of the controller Alice can be represented as follows:
ipr(Alice,Y) <- X = #count {denyBy(Alice,U1) : user(U1)} &
sensitivityLevel(Alice,funny.jpg,N) & Y = X*N.
And the sharing lost of the controller can be computed as:
isl(Alice,Y) <- X = #count {permitBy(Alice,U1) : user(U1)} &
sensitivityLevel(Alice,funny.jpg,N) & Y = X*(5-N).
5.5 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, I address the prototype implementation of the proposed application
in the context of Facebook and discuss the experimental results.
Prototype Implementation
A proof-of-concept Facebook application has been implemented for the collabora-
tive management of shared data called Retinue (http://apps.facebook.com/retinue tool).
This prototype application enables multiple associated users to specify their privacy
concerns to co-control a shared data item. Retinue is designed as a third-party Face-
book application which is hosted in an Apache Tomcat application server support-
ing PHP and MySQL databases, with a user interface built using jQuery and jQuery
UI and built on an AJAX-based interaction model. Retinue application is based on
the iFrame external application approach. Using the Javascript and PHP SDK, it
accesses users’ Facebook data through the Graph API and Facebook Query Lan-
guage. It is worth noting that the current implementation was restricted to handle
photo sharing in OSNs. Obversely, the proposed approach can be generalized to
deal with other kinds of data sharing (e.g. videos and comments) in OSNs as long
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(a) Collaborative control overview.
(b) Operational components in Retinue application.
Figure 5.5: System architecture of Retinue.
as the stakeholder of shared data are identified with effective methods like tagging
or searching.
Figure 5.5 shows the system architecture of Retinue. The overview of col-
laborative control process is depicted in Figure 5.5(a), where the owner can regulate
the access of the shared data. In addition, other controllers, such as the contribu-
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(a) Main interface. (b) Controllers’ interfaces.
Figure 5.6: Retinue interfaces.
tor, stakeholders and disseminators, can specify their privacy concerns over the
shared data as well. To effectively resolve privacy conflicts caused by different pri-
vacy concerns of multiple controllers, the data owner can also adjust the preference
weights for the privacy risk and the sharing loss to make an appropriate privacy-
sharing tradeoff. Figure 5.5(b) shows the core components in Retinue application
and their interactions. The Retinue application is hosted on an external website, but
is accessed on a Facebook application frame via an iFrame. The Facebook server
handles login and authentication for the application, and other user data is imported
on the user’s first login. At this point, users are asked to specify their initial privacy
settings and concerns for each type of photo. All photos are then imported and
saved using these initial privacy settings. Users’ networks and friend lists are im-
ported from Facebook server as well. Once information is imported, a user accesses
Retinue through the application page on Facebook, where s/he can query access in-
formation, complete privacy setting for photos in which s/he is a controller, and
view photos s/he is allowed to access. The component for privacy conflict man-
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agement in Retinue application is responsible for the privacy conflict detection and
resolution, and the generation of conflict-resolved privacy policy, which is then used
to evaluate access requests for the shared data.
A snapshot of the main interface of Retinue is shown in Figure 5.6 (a). All
photos are loaded into a gallery-style interface. To access photos, a user clicks the
“Access” tab and then s/he can view her/his friends’ photos that s/he was authorized.
To control photo sharing, a user clicks the “Owned”, “Tagged”, “Contributed”, or
“Disseminated” tabs, then selects any photo in the gallery to define her/his privacy
preferences for that photo. The controllers’ interfaces are depicted in Figure 5.6 (b).
A controller can select the trusted groups of accessors and assign corresponding
trust levels, as well as choose the sensitivity level for the photo. Also, the privacy
risk and sharing loss for the controller with respect with the photo are displayed
in the interface. In addition, the controller can immediately see how many friends
can or cannot access the photo in the interface. If the controller clicks the buttons,
which show the numbers of accessible or unaccessible friends, a window appears
showing the details of all friends who can or cannot view the photo. The purpose
of such feedback information is not only to give a controller the information of
how many friends can or cannot access the photo, but as a way to react to results.
If the controller is not satisfied with the current situation of privacy control, s/he
may adjust her/his privacy settings, contact the owner of the photo to ask her/him to
change the weights for the privacy risk and the sharing loss, or even report a privacy
violation to request OSN administrators to delete the photo. If the user is the owner
of the photo, s/he can also view the overall privacy risk and sharing loss for the
shared photo, and has the ability to adjust the weights to balance privacy protection
and data sharing of the shared photo.
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(a) Naive solution. (b) Facebook solution. (c) Retinue solution.
Figure 5.7: Example of resolving privacy conflicts.
Evaluation and Experiment
Here I address the evaluation of the proposed conflict resolution approach and sys-
tem usability study.
Evaluation of Privacy Conflict Resolution
I evaluate the proposed approach for privacy conflict resolution by comparing Ret-
inue solution with the naive solution and the privacy control solution used by ex-
isting OSNs, such as Facebook (simply called Facebook solution in the rest of this
dissertation) with respect to two metrics, privacy risk and sharing loss. Consider
the example demonstrated in Figure 5.4, where three controllers desire to regulate
access of a shared data item. The naive solution is that only the accessors in the non-
conflicting segment are allowed to access the data item as shown in Figure 5.7(a).
Thus, the privacy risk is always equal to 0 for this solution. However, the sharing
loss is the absolute maximum, as all conflicting segments, which may be allowed by
at least one controller, are always denied. The Facebook solution is that the owner’s
decision has the highest priority. All accessors within the segments covered by the
owner’s space are allowed to access the data item, but all other accessors are denied
as illustrated in Figure 5.7(b). This is, obviously, ideal for the owner, since her/his
privacy risk and sharing loss are both equal to 0. However, the privacy risk and the
sharing loss are large for every non-owner controller.
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(a) Privacy risk.
(b) Sharing loss.
(c) Resolving score.
Figure 5.8: Conflict resolution evaluation.
For Retinue solution, each conflicting segment is evaluated individually. Us-
ing the same example given in Figure 5.4, suppose cs1 and cs3 become permitted
conflicting segments after resolving the privacy conflicts. Figure 5.7(c) demon-
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strates the result of the privacy conflict resolution. Retinue solution make a tradeoff
between privacy protection and data sharing by maximizing the resolving score,
which is a combination of privacy risk and sharing loss. The worst case of Retinue
solution is the same as the naive solution–only mutually permitted accessors are al-
lowed to access the data item. However, this case only occurs when strong privacy
concerns are indicated by each controller. On the other hand, if all accessors have
pretty weak privacy concerns, all accessors in conflicting segments may be allowed
to access the data, which is not possible with either of other two solutions. Such a
case leads to a sharing loss of 0, but does not have an significantly increased privacy
risk against other two solutions.
To quantitatively evaluate Retinue solution, the experiment used cases where
there are three controllers of shared data items and assume that each controller has
indicated to allow her/his friends to view the data item. I also utilized the average
number of user friends, 130, which is claimed by Facebook statistics [110]. Ad-
ditionally, assume all controllers share 30 friends with each other, 10 of which are
shared among everyone (common users). All settings including privacy concerns,
sensitivity levels, and trust levels were randomized for each case, and the privacy
risk, sharing loss, and resolving score for each case were calculated. To represent
the data sensibly, the samples were sorted from lowest resolving score to highest
under the evaluation. Figure 5.8 shows the experimental results with respect to
randomly generated 30 user cases.
In Figure 5.8(a), we can observe that the privacy risks for the naive solution
are always equal to 0, since no untrusted accessors are allowed to view the data item.
The privacy risks for Facebook solution and Retinue solution wavered. Obviously,
this depends greatly on the settings of the non-owner controllers. If these controllers
are apathetic toward the shared data item, Facebook solution will be preferable.
139
However, it should be noted that Facebook solution had very high extrema. This is
avoided in Retinue solution where high privacy risks will usually result in denying
access.
Unsurprisingly, the sharing loss for the naive solution was always the high-
est, and often higher than both other two solutions as shown in Figure 5.8(b). Ret-
inue solution usually had the lowest sharing loss, and sometimes is equivalent to
the naive or Facebook solution, but rarely greater than. One may notice that the
sharing loss is very low compared to the privacy risks in this experience. This is an
inherent effect of Retinue solution itself–if sharing loss is very high, users will be
granted access to the data item, changing this segment’s sharing loss to zero.
As we can notice from Figure 5.8(c), the resolving score for Retinue solution
is always as good as or better than the naive or Facebook solution. In the sample
data, it was usually significantly better, and rarely was the same as either of other
two solutions. It further indicates that Retinue solution can always achieve a good
tradeoff between privacy protection and data sharing for privacy conflict resolution.
Evaluation of System Usability
Participants and Procedure: Retinue is a functional proof-of-concept implementa-
tion of collaborative privacy management. To measure the practicality and usability
of the proposed mechanism, I conducted a survey study (n=30) to explore the fac-
tors surrounding users’ desires for privacy controls such as those implemented in
Retinue. Particularly, I were interested in users’ perspectives on the current Face-
book privacy system and their desires for more control over photos they do not own.
I recruited participants through university mailing lists and through Facebook itself
using Facebook’s built-in sharing API. Users were given the opportunity to share
the application and play with their friends. While this is not a random sampling,
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Table 5.1: Usability evaluation for Facebook and Retinue privacy controls.
Metric
Facebook Retinue
Average Upper bound on 95% Average Lower bound on 95%confidence interval confidence interval
Likability 0.20 0.25 0.83 0.80
Simplicity/Usefulness 0.38 0.44 0.72 0.64
Control 0.20 0.25 0.83 0.80
recruiting using the natural dissemination features of Facebook arguably gives an
accurate profile of the ecosystem.
In the user study (http://bit.ly/retinue study), participants were asked to first
answer some questions about their usage and perception of Facebook’s privacy con-
trols. Users were then instructed to install the application using their Facebook pro-
files and complete the following actions: set privacy settings for a photo they do
not own, set privacy settings for a photo they own, and answer questions about their
understanding. As users completed these actions, they were asked questions on the
usability of the controls in Retinue.
User Study of Retinue: The criteria for usability evaluation were split into three
areas: likeability, simplicity/usefulness, and control. Likeability is a measure of a
user’s satisfaction with a system; simplicity/usefulness is a measure how intuitive
and useful the system is; and control is a measure of the user’s perceived control
of their personal data. All questions were either True/False or measured on a 5-
point likert scale (scaled from 0 to 1 for numerical analysis). For measurement and
analysis, a higher number is used to indicate a positive opinion or perception of the
system, while a lower number is used to indicate a negative one. I were interested in
the average user perception of the system, so I analyzed a 95% confidence interval
for the users’ answers. This assumes the population to be mostly normal.
Before Using Retinue. Before using Retinue, users were asked a few ques-
tions about their usage of Facebook to determine the user’s perceived usability of
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the current Facebook’s privacy controls. For the confidence interval, I were inter-
ested in determining the average user’s maximum positive opinion of Facebook’s
privacy controls, so I looked at the upper bound of the confidence interval.
An average user asserts at most 25% positively about the likability and con-
trol of Facebook’s privacy management mechanism, and at most 44% on Face-
book’s simplicity/usefulness as shown in Table 5.1. This demonstrates an average
negative opinion of the Facebook’s privacy controls that users currently must use.
A detailed table for the perceived usability evaluation of Facebook privacy controls
is provided in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Perceived usability of Factbook privacy controls (before using Retinue).
Evaluation Questions Average Positive Response
Likability 0.20
If someone uploads a photo of me, Facebook allows me to restrict whether 0.33
someone else can see it on my Facebook page: True (1) or False (0)
If someone uploads a photo of me, Facebook allows me to restrict whether 0.07
someone can see it through the uploader’s Facebook page: True(1) or False(0)
On Facebook, there is a high potential of my data being viewed by parties 0.17
I wish to hide it from - Strongly agree (1) - Strongly Disagree(5)
I am concerned with providing personal data (e.g. photos) on Facebook 0.22
because it could be used or abused in unforeseen ways - Strongly agree (1)
- Strongly Disagree(5)
Simplicity/Usefulness 0.38
In terms of everyday use I find the current Facebook privacy controls: 0.42
Confusing(1) - Intuitive/Understanding (5)
Facebook gives me adequate control over who can access the content I own: 0.48
No control(1)-Complete control(5)
Facebook gives me adequate control over who can access content 0.25
I have a stake in but do not own: No Control(1) - Complete Control(5)
Control 0.20
I wish I had more control over pictures I am tagged in: Selected (0) or Not (1) 0.13
I wish people I tagged in pictures I own could help control the privacy 0.13
of these photos: Selected (0) or Not (1)
I fear that sensitive photos I upload may be seen by people I do not want 0.33
to view them (e.g. parents, employers) : Selected (0) or Not (1)
I fear that sensitive photos OTHERS upload may be seen by people I do 0.13
not want to view them (e.g. parents, employers) : Selected (0) or Not (1)
I wish I could check if certain users had access to specific photos: 0.17
Selected (0) or Not (1)
After Using Retinue. Users were then asked to perform a few tasks in Ret-
inue: control settings for a photo they are tagged in, control settings for a photo
they own, and check user access to a photo they own or are in. For the confidence
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interval, I were interested in determining the average user’s minimum positive opin-
ion of Retinue’s privacy controls, so I looked at the lower bound of the confidence
interval.
An average user asserts at least 80% positively about the likability and con-
trol of Retinue’s privacy controls, and at least 64% positively on Retinue’s simplici-
ty/usefulness as shown in Table 5.1. This demonstrates an average positive opinion
of the controls and ideas presented to users in Retinue. A detailed table for the
perceived usability evaluation of Retinue privacy controls is given in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Perceived usability of Retinue privacy controls (after using Retinue).
Evaluation Questions Average Positive Response
Likability 0.83
I would use tagged/posted controls on a daily basis if implemented in Facebook 0.8
I would use owner controls on a daily basis if implemented in Facebook 0.73
I would use query controls on a daily basis were they implemented in Facebook 0.8
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.93
I would be happier with privacy controls
I like the idea of sharing control of my photos with those tagged 0.83
I like the idea of sharing control of my photos with those who posted them on my wall 0.81
I like the idea of being able to control photos in which I am tagged 0.86
Simplicity/Usefulness 0.72
Setting my privacy settings for a photo in Retinue is Complicated (1) - Simple (5) 0.48
Setting tagged/posted privacy settings in Facebook is Less complicated (0) - More 0.6
complicated/Not possible (1)
Controlling a photo as an owner in Retinue is Complicated (1) - Simple (5) 0.65
Setting privacy for photos I own on Facebook is Less complicated (0) - More 0.4
complicated/Not possible (1)
Querying user access to a photo in Retinue is Complicated (1) - Simple (5) 0.82
Querying user access on Facebook is Less complicated (0) - More complicated 0.73
/Not possible (1)
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.87
I would be more likely to use privacy controls on a regular basis
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.88
my photo privacy would be improved
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.86
my usage of privacy controls would be clearer and more understandable
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.75
controlling privacy would require less mental effort
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.76
it would be easier to control photo privacy
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.81
it would be easier to understand who can access my photos
Control 0.83
I feel more in control of tagged/posted photos on Facebook (1) - Retinue (5) 0.83
I feel more in control of photos I own on Facebook (1) - Retinue (5) 0.75
I feel more aware of others’ ability to see my photos on Facebook (1) - Retinue (5) 0.78
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.88
my photos would be better protected
If Facebook Implemented controls like Retinue’s to control photo privacy, 0.9
I would have more control over my photos
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5.6 Discussion
In the multiparty access control system, a group of users could collude with one
another so as to manipulate the final access control decision. Consider an attack
scenario, where a set of malicious users may want to make a shared photo available
to a wider audience. Suppose they can access the photo, and then they all tag
themselves or fake their identities to the photo. In addition, they collude with each
other to assign a very low sensitivity level for the photo and specify policies to grant
a wider audience to access the photo. With a large number of colluding users, the
photo may be disclosed to those users who are not expected to gain the access. To
prevent such an attack scenario from occurring, three conditions need to be satisfied:
(1) there is no fake identity in OSNs; (2) all tagged users are real users appeared
in the photo; and (3) all controllers of the photo are honest to specify their privacy
preferences.
Regarding the first condition, two typical attacks, Sybil attacks [127] and
Identity Clone attacks [128], have been introduced to OSNs and several effective
approaches have been recently proposed to prevent the former [129, 130] and lat-
ter attacks [131], respectively. To guarantee the second condition, an effective tag
validation mechanism is needed to verify each tagged user against the photo. In the
current system, if any users tag themselves or others in a photo, the photo owner will
receive a tag notification. Then, the owner can verify the correctness of the tagged
users. As effective automated algorithms (e.g., facial recognition [132]) are being
developed to recognize people accurately in contents such as photos, automatic tag
validation is feasible. Considering the third condition, the current system provides a
function to indicate the potential authorization impact with respect to a controller’s
privacy preference. Using such a function, the photo owner can examine all users
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who are granted the access by the collaborative authorization and are not explicitly
granted by the owner her/himself. Thus, it enables the owner to discover potential
malicious activities in collaborative control. The detection of collusion behaviors
in collaborative systems has been addressed by the recent work [133, 134]. The
future work would integrate an effective collusion detection technique into MPAC.
To prevent collusion activities, the current prototype has implemented a function
for owner control, where the photo owner can disable any controller, who is sus-
pected to be malicious, from participating in collaborative control of the photo. In
addition, I would further investigate how users’ reputations–based on their collab-
oration activities–can be applied to prevent and detect malicious activities in the
future work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, I summarize the contributions of this dissertation and discuss some
directions for future work.
6.1 Summary
Security has become a core ingredient of nearly most modern software and informa-
tion systems. However, security countermeasures are often integrated into existing
systems after significant security problems are discovered during the administration
or usage phase. In order to effectively address security aspects in secure system de-
velopment and management, more convenient and mature mechanisms should be
designed.
In this dissertation, I have presented an Assurance Management Framework
(AMF) for comprehensive analysis and realization of access control models in se-
cure system development, through access control model representation, constraint
specification, generation of enforcement code, and analysis and testing of access
control models. I introduced the concept of an authorization state space to assist
tasks in identifying unique characteristics of constraints in access control model
specification during a course of the model analysis. Corresponding analysis pro-
cesses for the formal verification and automatic test generation were articulated as
well. In addition, I demonstrated how the proposed methodology can be applied to
build role-based access control systems by adopting the NIST/ANSI RBAC stan-
dard as an underlying security model. For the realization of RBACmodel, I showed
how the formal RBAC model and constraints can be represented with UML dia-
grams and OCL expressions. The UML/OCL-based specifications of RBAC model
and constraints enable the automatic generation of executable authorization mod-
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els. To analyze the RBAC model, I utilized Alloy as an underlying formal verifica-
tion tool to demonstrate automatic analysis and test case generation for the formal
specifications of RBAC model. An RBAC authorization environment RAE and a
simulation system RASS were implemented as well to accommodate core features
addressed in the AMF framework.
On the other hand, the AMF framework ensures the correctness of access
control policies in policy-based computing through automated reasoning techniques
and anomaly management mechanisms. I demonstrated a systematic method to
represent XACML policies in ASP that allows users to leverage ASP solvers for a
variety of analysis tasks. I also discussed the design of a tool called XACML2ASP,
which can seamlessly work with existing ASP solvers for XACML policy analysis.
In addition, I presented a novel anomaly management mechanism and a grid-based
visualization approach, which enable effective detection and resolution of policy
anomalies. An anomaly analysis tool for XACML policies called XAnalyzer was
implemented as well.
Online social networks (OSNs) have experienced tremendous growth in re-
cent years and become a de facto portal for hundreds of millions of Internet users.
However, OSNs currently do not provide any mechanism to enforce privacy con-
cerns over data associated with multiple users. To this end, I further evaluated
the AMF framework through modeling and analyzing multiparty access control in
OSNs. I first formulated an access control model to capture the essence of mul-
tiparty authorization requirements, followed by a multiparty policy specification
scheme. Then, I provided a systematic mechanism to identify and resolve privacy
conflicts for collaborative data sharing. The conflict resolution in this work indi-
cates a tradeoff between privacy protection and data sharing by quantifying privacy
risk and sharing loss. I also presented a logical representation of the access control
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model with ASP for performing various analysis tasks on the model. A proof-of-
concept implementation of the proposed solution called Retinue was discussed as
well, along with the extensive system evaluation and usability study.
Contribution
As a summary, the contributions of this research are as follows:
• Articulation of automated analysis and thorough realization of formal access
control models in secure system development via model representation, gen-
eration of enforcement code, and verification and testing of access control
models.
• A logic-based reasoning approach for access control policies, adopting a log-
ical programming to formulate access control policies that allows users to
leverage the features of logic solvers in performing various logical reasoning
and analysis tasks.
• A comprehensive anomaly management mechanism incorporated with a
visualization-based policy representation to facilitate systematic and effective
detection and resolution of access control policy anomalies.
• Evaluation of the applicability of proposed AMF framework through mod-
eling and analyzing multiparty access control, which facilitates a systematic
solution for collaborative management of shared data in OSNs.
• Demonstration of the feasibility of the proposed methodology through a suite
of proof-of-concept implementations.
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6.2 Future Work
This ground-breaking work also has several future research directions:
Realization and Analysis of Access Control Model
The toolset in this work for realizing and analyzing access control models consti-
tutes a set of modules including a formal analysis tool such as Alloy Analyzer to
facilitate the features of the proposed methodology in performing tasks related to
analysis and conformance testing of role-based authorization systems. As part of
future work, I would examine how such a formal analysis can be integrated seam-
lessly with the toolset. In addition, to address the limitation of using SAT solver for
the purpose of formal analysis, I plan to investigate the relationship between the size
of represented model and the time required for verification and test case generation
in this approach. Furthermore, I would attempt to extend the framework for dealing
with more complicated system properties such as temporal and context attributes.
Thus, other specification languages and tools for performing formal analysis in the
framework would be investigated as well. Moreover, I believe that more practi-
cal engineering processes for secure system development should be addressed so
that software developers can easily adopt this approach in their development prac-
tices [135]. Therefore, I would explore such a practical engineering process for
building authorization systems based on the AMF framework.
Analysis and Management of Access Control Policy
I have demonstrated the logic-based policy reasoning approach using ASP and the
policy anomaly management mechanism based on BDD. A comparison of various
techniques for policy analysis should be conducted, guiding the policy designers
to choose appropriate methods for different policy analysis tasks. Also, the cov-
erage of the proposed policy analysis approach needs to be further extended with
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respect to more policy features such as handling multi-valued requests, compli-
cated conditions, obligation, and user-defined functions. In addition, it is necessary
to enhance the policy analysis tool in this work to provide those features and cor-
responding analysis services while obscuring the details of the logic formalism.
Furthermore, I would evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed policy analysis
and management approach and conduct usability studies of the proposed policy
visualization approach with subject matter experts. Besides, I plan to extend the
proposed analysis approach to handle distributed policy management. Addition-
ally, even though I have applied the anomaly analysis mechanism to XACML [123]
and firewall policies [50, 24], I would further explore how the policy analysis and
anomaly management mechanism can be applied to more existing access control
policy languages [51], such as SAML [7], Ponder [8] and EPAL [9].
Applying AMF to Emerging Domains
I would apply the AMF framework to address the security challenges brought by
emerging domains, including social networks [76, 117, 136, 137, 138, 139], cloud
computing [140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146], mobile computing [147, 148, 149],
and healthcare systems [57, 58, 150].
Social Networks
As the popularity of OSNs continues to grow, a huge amount of personal and private
information uploaded to OSNs. To protect such a large volume of sensitive infor-
mation, much more research needs to be done in the field of security and privacy for
OSNs. In OSNs, collaborative mechanism may allow users to take advantage of the
wisdom of crowds when making policy decisions related to user-to-user interaction.
I plan to continue this research in the direction of multiparty access control to ex-
plore comprehensive decision making methods, such as decision making based on
game theory [151], and analysis services for collaborative management of shared
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data in OSNs. Also, I would explore more criteria to evaluate the features of the
proposed MPAC model. For example, more comprehensive experiments should be
conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of MPAC conflict resolution approach based
on the tradeoff of privacy risk and sharing loss [136]. In addition, users may be in-
volved in the control of a larger number of shared photos and the configurations of
the privacy preferences may become time-consuming and tedious tasks in OSNs.
Therefore, I would study inference-based techniques [152] that leverage machine
learning and data mining approaches to facilitate both smart user management and
automated privacy policy configuration in MPAC. Besides, I plan to systematically
integrate the notion of trust and reputation into the MPAC model and investigate a
comprehensive solution to cope with collusion attacks for providing a robust MPAC
service in OSNs. Also, I would extend this work to address security and privacy
challenges for other social network platforms such as Google+ [122].
Cloud Computing
The emerging cloud-computing paradigm is rapidly gaining momentum as an al-
ternative to traditional information technology due to the reason that it provides
an extensible and powerful environment for growing amounts of services and data.
However, the unique aspects of cloud computing also exacerbate security and pri-
vacy challenges. Based on the proposed AMF framework, I am planning to ex-
plore various approaches to cope with the access control challenges in clouds. In
particular, I noticed that extensive collaborations exist among services provided
by different clouds, which might have different security mechanisms and privacy
management approaches. Hence, I will explore the approaches to address the het-
erogeneity among the policies from different cloud domains. And I believe that
the use of policy ontology [51] is a promising approach to accommodate such an
issue. Additionally, since policy conflicts are inevitable, arising in the interopera-
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tion process of multi-domain services in clouds, a more comprehensive mechanism
for policy anomaly detection and resolution [123, 24] is essential to prevent the
potential security breaches caused by policy integration in cloud computing.
Mobile Computing
Nowadays, OSN providers like Facebook or Google offer their users with web-
based Location-based Services (LBSs) like Facebook Places [153] or Google Lati-
tude [154]. To facilitate proactive LBSs, most OSN providers also provide Location-
based Social Network Services (LB-SNSs) for mobile platforms like the Android,
iOS, or Symbian. However, at present almost none of these implementations guar-
antees a sufficient degree of information security and privacy as well as location
integrity for their users. To address these limitations, I intend to apply the AMF
framework to explore solutions that support a secure, privacy-preserving, and
location-restricted LB-SNSs for mobile platforms. Furthermore, as smartphones
have become an indispensable part of daily life, mobile users are increasingly rely-
ing on them to process personal information with feature-rich applications. How-
ever, recent studies show that smartphone platforms are vulnerable to a variety
of attacks that could bypass these existing security mechanisms [147, 148]. This
requires robust security systems for protecting sensitive applications and data on
mobile devices. Thus, I would apply the AMF framework to investigate effective
mechanisms for enhancing existing smartphone protection systems.
Healthcare Systems
Security and privacy in healthcare systems grow in importance. The adoption of
electronic health records, increased regulation, provider consolidation and the in-
creasing need for information exchange between patients, providers and payers, all
point towards the need for developing effective security and privacy mechanisms
to protect healthcare systems. Moreover, the advent of social networking applica-
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tions for healthcare systems, such as Google Health [155] and Microsoft Health-
Vault [156], has the potential to significantly alter the manner in which patients in-
teract with healthcare providers. Therefore, I would apply the AMF framework to
address a variety of security and privacy issues in healthcare systems including data
integrity, regulatory compliance, selective sharing, consent delegation, trust man-
agement, and so on. In particular, based on a unified logical EHR model [57, 58]
and a compliance analysis framework for healthcare systems [150], I would in-
vestigate how the AMF framework can systematically manage complex policies to
reduce risks in such a dynamic and collaborative environment.
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